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FOR  DECADES health insurance  in the United States has been provided 
to most nonelderly  Americans  through  their own or a family member's 
employment. This system of employment-based  health insurance has 
evolved largely  because of the substantial  cost advantages  that  employ- 
ers enjoy in supplying  health  insurance.  By pooling  large  numbers  of in- 
dividuals, employers face significantly  lower administrative  expenses 
than  do individuals.  In addition,  employer  expenditures  on health  insur- 
ance are tax deductible,  but individual  expenditures  are generally  not.  I 
Despite these cost advantages, there is widespread dissatisfaction 
with this system of employment-based  health insurance. Many people 
are  excluded  because not all employers  provide  health  insurance  and  not 
all individuals  live in households  in which someone is employed. An es- 
timated 36 million Americans were uninsured  in 1990.2 Even among 
those fortunate enough to have employer-provided  health insurance, 
there is mounting  concern that it discourages individuals  with preex- 
isting  conditions  from  changing  jobs and, for those who do change  jobs, 
it often means finding  a new doctor because insurance  plans vary from 
firm  to firm. 
I wish  to thank  Gary  Burtless,  David  Cutler,  Jon  Gruber,  Jerry  Hausman,  Jim  Poterba, 
and  Andrew  Samwick  for their  comments  and  suggestions. 
1. Under  current  tax law, there are two circumstances  in which individuals  may de- 
duct  their  expenditures  on health  insurance:  (1) those who are self-employed  and  who do 
not have access to employer-provided  health insurance  through  another  job or their 
spouse's employment  may deduct  25 percent  of their expenditures  on health  insurance, 
and  (2)  those  who itemize  may  deduct  their  medical  expenses, including  the cost of health 
insurance,  to the extent  that  these expenditures  exceed 7.5 percent  of income. 
2. Piacentini  and  Foley (1992,  p. 185). 
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This dissatisfaction  with the present system of employer-provided 
health  insurance  is one of the factors driving  the current  move toward 
health  care reform.  Most proposals  specifically  address  the problems  of 
access and continuity  of coverage outlined  above. For example, under 
President  Clinton's  plan, employers  must help pay for the insurance  of 
their  employees  but  need not provide  it directly.  Employees  at firms  that 
opt not to provide insurance would be covered by a plan of the em- 
ployee's choosing provided through  a regional health alliance, which 
would be able to achieve the same cost savings as employers. Although 
individuals  who are unemployed  or who choose not to work  would  have 
to pay the full cost of their insurance,  government  subsidies would be 
available to help defray the costs for those with low incomes and for 
early retirees. And all plans, whether provided by an employer or a 
health  alliance, would  prohibit  insurers  from  excluding  preexisting  con- 
ditions. While  other proposals  differ  in their  approach  to reform,  most, 
like the Clinton  plan, will fundamentally  change  the way that  health  care 
is either  financed  or delivered. 
Given the current  relationship  between health  insurance  and  employ- 
ment, any health care reform  will affect the structure  of the labor  mar- 
ket. This  paper  explores  one piece of the employment  relationship  that  is 
likely to change:  the decision  to retire.  Just  as employer-provided  health 
insurance  is thought  to deter  job mobility, it is also likely to deter re- 
tirement. 
Various  aspects of the proposals  raise three important  issues regard- 
ing the effects of reform  on retirement.  The first is the extent to which 
the provision of health insurance  is tied to employment. Severing the 
link between employment  and the receipt of health insurance  will in- 
crease the incentives to retire  early among  those who fear losing health 
insurance  coverage if they do so. But mandating  that  all employers  pro- 
vide health insurance  may also postpone the retirement  of some older 
workers  whose employers  did not previously  provide  health  insurance. 
The second issue is whether  the plan establishes purchasing  pools that 
make  nonemployment-based  health  insurance  available  to individuals  at 
the lower rates  usually  achieved  by firms.  These pools would  reduce  the 
cost of health insurance  in the private  market  and would therefore  en- 
courage  early  retirement.  The third  issue is whether  the plan subsidizes 
the purchase  of individual  health  insurance  by early retirees. Such sub- 
sidies  further  reduce  the cost of purchasing  private  health  insurance  and 
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To evaluate the effect that different  reform  proposals  might  have on 
retirement,  one must know the extent to which health insurance  influ- 
ences the retirement  decision. This paper attempts  to quantify  this ef- 
fect. I begin by examining  whether  health  insurance  affects other types 
of labor  market  behavior,  such as  job mobility  and  labor  force participa- 
tion. To the extent that health  insurance  affects these other  types of be- 
havior,  it is likely to influence  retirement.  I then  examine  the factors  that 
make health insurance  an important  consideration  in deciding  whether 
to retire. These include the need for health insurance,  which rises with 
age, and the availability  of health  insurance  after  retirement.  Among  in- 
dividuals  aged 55-64, those who are not employed are much less likely 
to be covered by employer-provided  health insurance  and much more 
likely  to be either  uninsured  or covered  by an individual  nongroup  policy 
or government-sponsored  health  insurance.  To the extent that  the latter 
types of insurance  are inferior  to employer-provided  health insurance, 
they may defer  retirement. 
Given these reasons why health  insurance  should  affect retirement,  I 
then briefly  review the existing  literature  on health  insurance  and  retire- 
ment. Previous  work  in this area  is limited,  mainly  because there  are  few 
data  sets that  describe  both health  insurance  and  labor  market  behavior. 
My analysis uses three individual-level  data sets: the 1987 National 
Medical  Expenditure  Survey and two subsets of the Survey of Income 
and Program  Participation.  All three include questions  on the age at re- 
tirement and the  availability of  employer-provided postretirement 
health  insurance. 
The next section of the paper  describes the availability  and structure 
of postretirement  health insurance  benefits. Although  the provision of 
these benefits  has increased  over time, less than  half  of the work  force is 
currently  employed by firms offering health insurance  to retirees. As 
might  be expected, workers  in large  firms  and those employed in high- 
wage industries  are more likely to receive such benefits. Surprisingly, 
eligibility  to receive retiree  health  benefits  is tied to the receipt of other 
retirement  benefits, such as a pension, for only one-quarter  of workers. 
Using the data described  above, I then examine the effect of retiree 
health  insurance  on age at retirement.  I find that those with employer- 
provided postretirement  health insurance retire 5-16 months earlier 
than those without such insurance.  This result is robust using various 
definitions  of retirement  and  regardless  of whether  individuals  receive a 
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having  retiree  health  insurance  or whether  a firm's  provision  of retiree 
health  insurance  is correlated  with overall  job quality,  the generosity  of 
pension  benefits, and  any incentives  for early  retirement  that  are part  of 
the pension  plans in these firms. 
Finally, I try to answer three questions about health insurance  and 
retirement.  The first  is what  impact  health  care  reform  might  have on the 
labor force participation  of older individuals.  I estimate that universal 
coverage would reduce the labor  force participation  of men aged 60-64 
by 4.3 percentage  points. To the extent that reform  is financed  through 
payroll  taxes rather  than through  individual  contributions,  such a labor 
supply  response would  reduce  the revenue  that  the government  collects 
from  these taxes. 
Second, I ask to what extent the increased availability of retiree 
health insurance  explains the aggregate  trend toward  early retirement. 
The labor  force participation  of men aged 55-64 has fallen steadily  over 
the past several decades. Much of this decline is attributable  to the in- 
creased generosity of both social security and private pensions. How- 
ever, these two factors together  can explain only one-third  to one-half 
of the decline in aggregate  labor  force participation.  Over  this same  time 
period, the availability  of retiree  health  insurance  has increased  as well. 
My estimates suggest that the increased availability  of postretirement 
health insurance  can explain between 10 and 20 percent of the overall 
decline in the labor  force participation  of older  men. 
The third question is whether eligibility  for Medicare explains the 
"excess"  spike  in the probability  of retirement  (the retirement  hazard)  at 
age 65. The social security system and many private  pensions provide 
incentives  to retire  at age 65;  consequently,  some spike  in the retirement 
hazard  at this age is not surprising.  However, the financial  incentives 
associated  with social security  and  pensions do not fully account  for the 
spike at 65.3  One potential  explanation  is that  individuals  wait until  they 
are eligible  for Medicare  before they retire  in order  to avoid being unin- 
sured or having to purchase  insurance  in the private market. If this is 
true, the excess spike should  exist only for those with retiree  health  in- 
surance.  I find  little evidence of this. Although  health  insurance  clearly 
affects retirement,  Medicare  does not appear  to explain the excess re- 
tirement  that  occurs at age 65. 
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Health Insurance and the Labor Market 
A substantial  fraction  of the expenditures  on employee  compensation 
is for benefits  rather  than  for direct  wage payments;  in 1990,  employers 
spent  $546  billion  on benefits,  about 17  percent  of total  compensation.4  It 
would  be surprising,  therefore,  for benefits  not to affect  the labor  market 
behavior  of individuals  and firms. Although  much research has exam- 
ined the role of pensions in the labor  market,  little work has been done 
on the role of health insurance, despite the fact that employers spend 
more on health  insurance  than on any other employee benefit. In 1990, 
outlays on health insurance  totaled $174.2 billion compared  with $127 
billion spent on pension plans and $137 billion on mandated  employer 
contributions  to social security. Furthermore,  health  insurance  expend- 
itures  are  the fastest growing  component  of benefit  payments,  increasing 
at an average rate of 15.6 percent annually  over the 1948-90 period.5 
Employer-provided  health  insurance  also affects more individuals  than 
do private pensions. Roughly two-thirds of full-time workers have 
health insurance  through  their employers, but only 50 percent partici- 
pate in employer-sponsored  pension plans. Because many  firms  extend 
health  insurance  coverage  to family  members  as well, the actual  number 
of individuals  who profit  from  this type of benefit  is even greater. 
Health  Insurance  and Individual Behavior 
There are many ways in which health insurance might affect labor 
market  behavior. Much  media  attention  has recently  focused on the ex- 
tent to which health  insurance  inhibits  job mobility,  the problem  of 'job- 
lock." Interest in this issue was spurred  by a front-page  article in the 
New York  Times citing a survey in which 30 percent of respondents 
claimed  that  "they  or someone in their  family  had, at some time, decided 
to stay in a job they wanted to leave mainly  because they did not want 
to lose health  coverage."6  Notwithstanding  the results of this and other 
surveys,  the actual  degree  ofjob-lock is difficult  to quantify  becausejob- 
4.  Piacentini and Foley (1992, p. 12). 
5.  Piacentini and Foley (1992, pp. 8, 19). 
6.  See Erick Eckholm, "Health Benefits Found to Deter Switches  in Jobs," New  York 
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lock cannot be measured  in the same way as other economic variables 
affecting  mobility,  such as union  status, wages, or education.  There  are, 
however, observable factors that should be correlated  with job-lock, 
such as the value of health  insurance.  Individuals  who place a high  value 
on health  insurance  should  display  a greater  sensitivity  to its availability 
when changing  jobs than  individuals  who place a low value on this bene- 
fit. Moreover,  individuals  whose employers  do not provide  health  insur- 
ance should  not be affected  by  job-lock since they face no loss in cover- 
age by changing  jobs. The degree of job-lock is therefore  inferred  from 
the different  job turnover  rates between those with high  and low valua- 
tions of health  insurance  for those with and without  employer-provided 
health  insurance. 
In other  work, I use three different  proxies for the value of health  in- 
surance  in order  to estimate the importance  of job-lock among  married 
men.7  The first is whether the individual  has an alternative source of 
health  insurance  not linked  to his employment,  such as that  provided  by 
a union  or through  the  job of a working  spouse. Having  this type of cov- 
erage mitigates  the cost of changing  jobs and should serve to increase 
mobility  and  decreasejob-lock. The second and third  proxies are  family 
size and  a wife's pregnancy,  both of which should  be correlated  with  ex- 
pected medical expenses, and thus the value of health insurance.  Men 
with a large  family or a pregnant  wife presumably  place a higher  value 
on health  insurance  and are less likely to change  jobs. Using data from 
the 1987  National  Medical  Expenditure  Survey, I find  that all three  fac- 
tors significantly  influence  the mobility of male workers, and their ef- 
fects are  more  pronounced  for those with  health  insurance  than  for those 
without. The results suggest that  job-lock accounts for a sizable 25 per- 
cent reduction  in mobility. This not only directly  affects the well-being 
of those who are "job-locked"  but may also affect the economy as a 
whole if betterjob matches  and  corresponding  increases in productivity 
are lost. 
Two other studies that conduct similar  tests support  the existence of 
job-lock.8 Additional  corroborating  evidence is provided by Jonathan 
Gruber  and myself. We find that laws allowing individuals  to maintain 
their coverage after changing  jobs increase mobility and reduce job- 
7. Madrian  (1994). 
8. Cooper  and  Monheit  (1993)  use the same  data,  and  Buchmueller  and  Valletta  (1994) 
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lock.9  These results are not undisputed,  however. Using data from the 
Survey of Income and Program  Participation  and the 1980 National 
Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure  Survey, John Penrod finds 
mixed evidence of job-lock.10  The findings  of Douglas Holtz-Eakin,  us- 
ing data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, suggest little  job- 
lock. II  This latter  study is the only one that  fails to find  evidence ofjob- 
lock, and the quality  of its data makes it difficult  to know whether the 
paper  finds  evidence against  job-lock or simply  against  the turnover  data 
in the panel  study.  12  Despite the somewhat  contradictory  results  in these 
latter two studies, the weight of the evidence supports  the conclusion 
that health insurance  is an important  factor in the decision to change 
jobs. 
Health insurance is  also an important consideration in deciding 
whether  to leave welfare. Individuals  on welfare  receive insurance  cov- 
erage  through  Medicaid  and  lose the coverage once they cease to be eli- 
gible  for welfare. Because the types ofjobs that  most individuals  on wel- 
fare  are likely  to get if they choose to work  do not offer  health  insurance, 
poor individuals  may decide against  leaving welfare simply  to maintain 
their Medicaid  benefits. Three recent studies all find  that losing Medic- 
aid is a substantial  deterrent  to leaving  welfare.  '3 
There  are several  other ways that  health  insurance  might  affect labor 
market  outcomes. Health  insurance  might  affect the decision to become 
self-employed,14 the duration  of unemployment,  the supply of labor  by 
secondary  earners,  the number  of hours  worked,  and  the choice of ajob. 
Firm  behavior  may also be influenced  by health insurance  through  the 
total demand  for labor, the relative demand  for high- versus low-wage 
employees, the compensation  packages  it chooses to offer, the decision 
to subcontract  for various types of labor services, and the decision to 
be "big"  or "small."  Although  there is little evidence on the empirical 
significance  of most of these effects, the many avenues through  which 
9. Gruber  and  Madrian  (1994). 
10. Penrod  (1993). 
1  1. Holtz-Eakin,  Penrod,  and  Rosen  (1994). 
12. The Panel  Study of Income  Dynamics  has very noisy and  inconsistent  measures 
of turnover.  Brown  and Light (1992)  suggest that the results of estimating  job turnover 
equations  with  these data  are particularly  sensitive  to how the data  are  cleaned. 
13. See Yelowitz  (1993),  Moffitt  and  Wolfe  (1992),  and  Ellwood  and  Adams  (1990). 
14. Holtz-Eakin,  Penrod,  and  Rosen (1994)  have done work suggesting  that  the effect 
of health  insurance  on self-employment  is small. 188  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Figure 1.  Employer-Provided Postretirement Health Insurance by Age at Retirement 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  using data from the  1987 National  Medical  E;xpenditure Survey. 
health insurance  can affect both individual  and firm  behavior  reinforce 
the belief that changes in the health  insurance  system may significantly 
affect the labor  market. 
Health  Insurance  and Early Retirement 
Given the substantial  effect of health insurance  on other types of la- 
bor market  behavior,  it is likely that health  insurance  affects retirement 
decisions as well. Anecdotal  evidence suggests this is the case. A recent 
Gallup  poll reports  that 63 percent  of working  Americans  "would  delay 
retirement  until  becoming  eligible  for Medicare  (age 65) if their  employ- 
ers were not going to provide health  coverage"  despite the fact that 50 
percent  "said  they would prefer  to retire  early-by  age 62."'- A simple 
tabulation  of postretirement  coverage by age at retirement  underscores 
the importance  of health insurance  in the decision to retire. As figure I 
shows, workers  who retire  at younger  ages are much  more  likely  to have 
employer-provided  postretirement  health insurance  than workers  who 
15. Employee  Benefit  Research  Institute  (1990). Brigitte  C. Madrian  189 
retire  at older ages. Almost 64 percent of those who retire  between the 
ages of 55 and 59 have postretirement  insurance,  but only 32 percent  of 
those retiring  between the ages of 66 and 69 have such coverage. 
The rationale  for why health insurance should affect retirement  is 
straightforward.  As noted earlier,  the vast majority  of individuals  in the 
United  States receive their  health  insurance  coverage  through  their  own 
employment  or that of a family member.  This insurance  is not typically 
portable,  however. That is, when an individual  quits his or her  job, the 
insurance  coverage associated with that  job ceases as well.  16 Once indi- 
viduals reach age 65, health insurance  coverage is no longer  a problem 
because everyone 65 years  or older, whether  retired  or not, is eligible  for 
Medicare. But unlike social security, one cannot qualify  for Medicare 
before  age 65. For some individuals,  this is not a problem  since their  em- 
ployer  provides  postretirement  health  insurance  benefits  for early  retire- 
ment, but  for the majority  of workers  early  retiree  benefits  are not avail- 
able through  their  employer. 
Of course, individuals  contemplating  early retirement  can purchase 
health  insurance  in the private  market,  but this may be an unattractive 
option for older individuals  for several reasons. One is that employers 
can provide  insurance  at a much  lower price  than  that  faced by individu- 
als in the private  market.  By pooling  the risks of many individuals,  em- 
ployers can reduce adverse selection and lower administrative  ex- 
penses. These two factors alone reduce the cost of providing  insurance 
in large  firms  by 35 percent.  17 In addition,  health insurance  available  to 
individuals  tends to be less generous  than that provided  by employers: 
it comes with higher  copayments and deductibles and is less likely to 
cover benefits  like diagnostic  services and  prescription  drugs.  '8 A poten- 
tially more important  factor than either cost or generosity of benefits, 
however, is the fact that  exclusions of preexisting  conditions  are typical 
of almost all individual  policies. For individuals  with health problems, 
they make the relative cost of health insurance  in the private market 
even greater.  The cost and risk  associated with buying  health  insurance 
16. Federal  legislation  under  the Consolidated  Omnibus  Budget and Reconciliation 
Act of 1985  (COBRA)  now allows  individuals  to maintain  their  health  insurance  through  a 
former  employer  for up to 18 months;  the individual,  however, must pay the full cost of 
the coverage.  Gruber  and Madrian  (1993a, 1993b)  examine  the effects of this legislation 
and  similar  state  laws on the age at retirement  of older  workers. 
17. Congressional  Research  Service  (1989,  p. 46). 
18. See Gruber  and  Madrian  (1994)  and  Farley  (1986). 190  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Table 1.  Aging and Health Status 
Percent,  except  expenditures 
Age  group 
Health  measure  35-44  45-54  55-64  65-74 
Self-reported  health status 
Excellent  or good health  86.6  80.2  68.8  56.8 
Fair or poor health  13.4  19.8  31.2  43.2 
Incidence  of health pi.oblemsa 
One problem  31.6  51.7  72.2  81.8 
Two  or more problems  9.5  22.6  42.3  57.1 
Three or more problems  2.8  10.2  21.5  34.5 
Medical  expenditures 
Average  total medical expendituresb  1,652  2,650  3,666  5,893 
(4,711)  (8,938)  (11,185)  (15,782) 
Average  total medical expenditures  1,957  3,106  4,125  6,348 
if greater than zerob  (5,070)  (9,605)  (11,784)  (16,292) 
Medical  expenditures  as a percent of 
total family income  4.0  6.0  9.4  22.6 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using data from the  1987 National  Medical Expenditure  Survey. 
a.  The  II  diagnosed  health conditions  are stroke,  cancer,  heart attack,  gallbladder disease,  high blood  pressure, 
arteriosclerosis,  rheumatism, emphysema,  arthritis, diabetes,  and heart disease. 
b.  Expenditures  in dollars are inflated to  1991 prices by the growth in total health care expenditures  between  1987 
and  1991. Standard deviations  of expenditures  are given  in parentheses. 
in the private market  may therefore  serve as a substantial  deterrent  to 
early  retirement.  Although  health  insurance  is unlikely  to affect  the deci- 
sions of those who want  to retire  after  age 65, it will be a real  concern  for 
the many individuals  who would like to retire  before age 65 but who do 
not want  to give up their  employer-provided  health  insurance. 
The need for health  insurance  increases  with age, as evidenced  by the 
variety of measures  shown in table 1. The first measure, health status, 
gives the fraction  of people in each age group  reporting  their  health  to be 
excellent or good versus fair or poor. Among  those aged 55-64, almost 
one-third  reported  being in fair or poor health, a substantially  higher 
fraction than among the younger age groups. Although self-reported 
health  status does not necessarily  indicate  the actual  severity of an indi- 
vidual's clinical diagnoses,'9  it is likely to be an accurate reflection  of 
how much  an individual  values health  insurance. 
The need for insurance  as measured  by actual health  conditions  also 
increases  with age. Table 1 shows the percent  of individuals  who report 
19.  Bazzoli (1985). Brigitte  C. Madrian  191 
Table 2.  Type of Insurance by Age and Employment Status 
Percent 
Ages  25-54  Ages  55-64 
Not  Not 
Insurance  All  Employed  employed  All  Employed  employed 
Employer  provided  71.6  78.5  44.2  64.5  76.3  51.6 
Policy  in own  name  51.1  62.7  4.2  44.8  63.1  24.7 
Other group coverage  1.2  1.1  1.3  4.1  4.0  4.3 
Nongroup  insurance  5.9  5.8  6.2  14.5  12.6  16.6 
CHAMPUS-CHAMPVAa  5.7  4.9  8.8  7.7  6.4  9.2 
Medicare or Medicaid  5.6  1.2  23.4  10.4  0.8  20.9 
Uninsured  15.4  13.5  23.0  12.0  10.1  14.1 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using data from the  1987 National  Medical Expenditure  Survey. 
a.  CHAMPUS  and CHAMPVA  stand for Civilian  Health  and Medical  Program for  the Uniformed  Services  and 
Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Veterans  Administration,  respectively. 
having been diagnosed with 1 or more of 11 health conditions ranging 
from cancer, to a heart attack, to high blood pressure, to arthritis.  As 
can be seen, the likelihood  of having  one of these conditions increases 
dramatically  between the ages of 45-54 and 55-64. Almost three-quar- 
ters of those aged 55-64 have been diagnosed  with at least 1 of the 11 
conditions, and more than 20 percent have been diagnosed with 3 or 
more. 
A third measure of the need for health insurance, also shown in 
table 1, is actual expenditures  on health care. Average total expendi- 
tures of those aged 55-64 were $3,666  in 1991  dollars. That  is almost 40 
percent  greater  than  the average  total expenditures  of those aged 45-54 
and more than twice that of individuals  aged 35-44. Average expendi- 
tures  conditional  on having  had  any expenditures  show a similar  pattern. 
Not only do expenditures  increase  with age, but  their  variance  increases 
as well. The last row of table 1 gives individual  medical  expenditures  as 
a percent of total family income. Medical expenses, which constitute 
only 4 percent of income for those aged 35-44, climb to almost 10 per- 
cent of income for those aged 55-64. As these percentages  reflect only 
individual expenditures,  totalfamily  expenditures  would constitute  an 
even larger  portion  of income. 
Given  this supposed  need  for health  insurance,  what  type of coverage 
do older  individuals  have?  Table  2 illustrates  the sources of health  insur- 
ance coverage by age and employment  status. The first  row shows the 
importance  of employer-provided  health insurance  at all ages, regard- 192  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
less of whether  an individual  works. There  are, nevertheless, significant 
differences  in coverage arising  from employment  status. Among those 
aged 55-64, persons who are not employed  are much  less likely to have 
employer-provided  health insurance, particularly  in their own name, 
and more likely than their employed counterparts  to be covered by a 
nongroup  policy or to be uninsured.  This implies  that  early  retirement  is 
often accompanied  by changes  in the type of private  insurance  coverage 
available  to individuals. 
Evidence  on Health  Insurance  and Retirement 
Despite a vast literature  on the effects of social security, pensions, 
health  status, and  disability  insurance  on retirement,  only a few very re- 
cent papers  examine the relationship  between health  insurance  and re- 
tirement.  It should  be said at the outset that  the biggest  obstacle to over- 
come in this research  is finding  appropriate  data  with which to estimate 
such a relationship.  Robin Lumsdaine,  James Stock, and David Wise 
use detailed  data  on employees from  a single  firm  to discern  whether  eli- 
gibility for Medicare  can explain the "excess" retirement  observed at 
age 65.20 Their results suggest that Medicare  has little effect on retire- 
ment, but it is difficult  to apply  this finding  to the population  at large  be- 
cause the individuals  in their sample all worked  for the same firm,  and 
that firm  happened  to provide  retiree  health  insurance.  With  employer- 
provided  postretirement  health insurance  available, it is not surprising 
that Medicare  would not affect the retirement  decision of this sample  of 
individuals. 
Lynn Karoly and Jeannette  Rogowski attempt  to exploit cross-firm 
variation  in the availability  of retiree health insurance.21 They use the 
1984  Survey  of Income  and  Program  Participation  to estimate  the proba- 
bility that individuals  retire over the course of an approximately  two- 
year  period  based  on whether  they are  likely to have retiree  health  insur- 
ance. Because they lack actual  data  on retiree  health  insurance,  they im- 
pute its provision based on firm size and industry. Although  they find 
that their  imputed  measure  of retiree  health  insurance  increases the re- 
tirement  hazard  by 50 percent, it is probably  an overestimate,  since firm 
20.  Lumsdaine, Stock,  and Wise (forthcoming). 
21.  Karoly and Rogowski  (1993). Brigitte C. Madrian  193 
size  and  industry  almost  certainly  help  determine  retirement  them- 
selves,  especially  to the extent  that they are correlated with the provi- 
sion  of  pensions. 
Gruber and Madrian circumvent the problem of having to impute re- 
tiree health insurance by evaluating the effect on retirement of an exoge- 
nous source of health insurance-that  provided through state and fed- 
eral  "continuation  of  coverage"  mandates  (also  known  as  COBRA 
provisions).22 These mandates allow individuals to continue purchasing 
health insurance through a previous employer for a specified number of 
months after leaving the firm. Their results suggest that one year of con- 
tinuation  coverage  increases  retirement  rates  by  20  percent.  The 
strength of the Gruber and Madrian analysis  is that this type of health 
insurance is unlikely to be correlated with other factors affecting retire- 
ment. However,  it is difficult to generalize to other types of health insur- 
ance because continuation coverage  is limited to 18 months. 
Finally,  Alan Gustman and Thomas  Steinmeier  use the Retirement 
History Survey to estimate a structural model of retirement that incor- 
porates the value of retiree health insurance, in addition to information 
on pension accruals.23 Their model requires defining the point in time at 
which individuals become eligible for retiree health insurance. They as- 
sume that this coincides  with pension eligibility; as will be shown later, 
however,  this is true only for one-quarter of those with retiree health in- 
surance. Their paper suggests that health insurance has only a relatively 
small effect on retirement, but this result is difficult to interpret given the 
forced collinearity of pension benefits and health insurance in the data. 
The present paper exploits three as yet unutilized data sets-the  1987 
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) and two supplements to 
the Survey  of Income  and Program Participation (SIPP)-to  estimate 
the effect of health insurance on retirement. All three data sets include 
information about the availability of employer-provided  retiree health 
insurance and age at retirement.  Although  these  data and the ensuing 
analysis have their limitations,  they also have certain advantages  rela- 
tive to the previous research on retirement and health insurance.  First, 
I am able to use actual data on employer-provided  postretirement health 
insurance rather than having to impute such coverage,  as Karoly and 
22.  See Gruber and Madrian (1993a, 1993b). 
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Rogowski do. Second, because this paper  focuses on the effects of re- 
tiree  health  insurance  in a representative  sample  of individuals,  it should 
be easier to generalize  its results than those in Lumsdaine,  Stock, and 
Wise or in Gruber  and  Madrian.  Third,  the estimation  of a reduced-form 
rather  than  a structural  model  does not require  assumptions  about  either 
the individual  valuation  of retiree  health  insurance  or its accrual. 
Structure of Postretirement  Health  Insurance  Benefits 
Because the primary  variable  of interest  in the ensuing  analysis  is re- 
tiree health insurance, this section of the paper provides some back- 
ground  on the availability  and structure  of postretirement  health insur- 
ance benefits. Before Medicare,  private  health  insurance  for the elderly 
was not widely available.  To meet the health  care needs of their  retired 
employees, firms  began providing  postretirement  health  insurance  ben- 
efits in the late 1940s  and 1950s.  At that  time  the labor  force was growing; 
there were relatively  few retirees;  and real medical  costs were substan- 
tially lower than  they are today. Therefore,  the costs of providing  these 
benefits  were largely  inconsequential.  When  Medicare  assumed  the ma- 
jor portion  of health  care expenditures  for the elderly  in 1965,  providing 
such benefits  became even more attractive  to firms,  and many  began to 
furnish  supplemental  health care benefits  for their retirees to cover de- 
ductibles  and other  costs not paid  by Medicare. 
Although  there are no consistent time series data to show the rise in 
the availability  of postretirement  health insurance, this growth can be 
seen in figures  2 and 3, which look in a cross-section at coverage rates 
by age and year of retirement.  Figure 2 shows that the young retired 
(those aged 65-74) are much more likely to have postretirement  health 
benefits than the old retired  (those over age 80). This suggests that the 
availability  of such benefits  grew  from  a little more  than  20 percent  in the 
1960s,  when the old retired  left theirjobs, to nearly  45 percent  in the late 
1970s  and early 1980s,  when the young retired  left their  jobs. Figure  3, 
which shows coverage  rates  by year of retirement,  reveals a similar  pat- 
tern. Nearly 30 percent  of those retiring  in the early 1960s  received post- 
retirement  health  insurance,  while more  than  45 percent  of those retiring 
during  the late 1970s  and 1980s  received such coverage. 
Information  on the availability of postretirement  health insurance 
among the currently  employed supports these figures. Data from the Brigitte  C. Madrian  195 
Figure  2. Employer-Provided  Postretirement  Health  Insurance  by Age 
Percent  with coverage 
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Source: Author's  calculations  using  data  from  the 1987  National  Medical  Expenditure  Survey,  the 1984  Survey  of 
Income  and Program  Participation,  and Current  Population  Survey,  August 1988. 
Figure  3. Employer-Provided  Postretirement  Health  Insurance  by Year of Retirement 
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August 1988 supplement  to the Current  Population  Survey on retiree 
health  insurance  suggest  that  48.7 percent  of employees over age 40 had 
health insurance benefits that continued beyond retirement.24  Firm- 
level data  paint  a similar  picture:  in 1988,  45 percent  of full-time  employ- 
ees in medium-sized  and  large  firms  under  age 65 were eligible  for retiree 
health  benefits  upon  retirement.25 
The types of firms  that  provide  postretirement  health  insurance  bene- 
fits vary, as do the types of individuals  who receive them. As might  be 
expected given the relationship  between firm  size and the provision of 
other employee benefits, large firms are much more likely to provide 
postretirement  health  benefits  than  small  firms.  Only 15  percent  of firms 
with fewer than 100  workers  provide such benefits, while more than 80 
percent  of firms  with more than  2,500 employees supply  postretirement 
health  insurance  benefits.26 
Table  3 illustrates  the considerable  variation  within  industries  and  oc- 
cupations  in the receipt of postretirement  health  insurance.  For the in- 
dustry  data,  more  than  two-thirds  of the individuals  who retire  fromjobs 
in public administration  receive postretirement  health insurance, but 
less than 15  percent  of those in sales, personal  services, and agriculture 
do so. Industries  that are more  likely to provide  pensions and health  in- 
surance  to their  active employees are more likely to provide  postretire- 
ment health  insurance  as well. 
One surprising  feature  of many  postretirement  health  insurance  bene- 
fit plans, several of which are shown in table 4, is that eligibility  is not 
necessarily  tied to the receipt  of other  retirement  benefits,  such as a pen- 
sion, or to an employee's length  of service.27  For only about  one-quarter 
of workers  are postretirement  health  benefits  contingent  on pension re- 
cipiency;  and  for more  than  one-third  of employees, no prerequisites  ex- 
ist (other  than  retirement)  for the receipt  of benefits.  Another  significant 
difference  between postretirement  health  benefits and pension benefits 
is that  health  benefits  are rarely  portable.  That  is, an employee's entitle- 
24.  Piacentini and Foley (1992, p. 229, table 6.28). 
25.  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989, table 60). 
26.  See Chollet (1989) and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1991). 
27.  The receipt of pensions and postretirement health benefits are nevertheless  highly 
correlated. Data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation suggest that 
among men aged 65 and older who are not in the labor force, 88 percent of those with post- 
retirement health insurance also receive  pension  benefits (author's calculation  using the 
SIPP-EWH data described later in the text). Brigitte C. Madrian  197 




health  Health 
Industry  or  insurance  insurance  Pension 
occupation  (NMES)  (CPS)  (CPS) 
Industry 
Agriculture,  forestry, and fishing  5.7  27.4  10.1 
Construction  31.0  49.9  28.6 
Manufacturing  46.8  80.8  59.6 
Transportation,  utilities, and communication  56.5  78.7  64.3 
Sales  13.8  55.1  31.0 
Finance, real estate, and insurance  32.7  69.3  50.4 
Personal  services  7.4  51.4  26.3 
Professional  services  35.2  64.5  54.3 
Public  administration  66.7  81.8  84.0 
Occupation 
Professional  and technical  50.1  73.6  61.1 
Clerical  42.6  66.1  52.2 
Sales  16.7  58.0  33.6 
Managerial  and administrative  38.9  74.2  53.9 
Craftsmen  and foremen  45.9  67.5  46.9 
Operatives  35.3  72.1  49.5 
Transportation  operatives  41.7  66.7  46.8 
Service workers  21.5  37.8  23.8 
Nonfarm  laborers  37.4  59.9  54.2 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on  the  1987 National  Medical  Expenditure  Survey  for individuals  aged  55 
and older who report having ever retired (weighted)  and on the Current Population Survey,  March 1988, for working 
individuals aged 25-50. 
ment  to postretirement  health  insurance  does not become vested and is 
forfeited  upon  preretirement  departure  from  a firm. 
The coverage of postretirement  health insurance  plans is typically 
identical  to that  provided  to active employees, with nearly  90 percent  of 
the firms  that  provide  postretirement  health  coverage  also providing  the 
same  coverage  to retirees  under  age 65 as to current  employees.28  Differ- 
ences in coverage, where they exist, are usually  minor,  such as reduced 
coverage  for vision care, prescription  drugs, and other "noncore"  med- 
ical benefits. Some companies also require retiree contributions to 
health insurance  premiums,  although  their plans for active employees 
are  noncontributory.  In general,  however, these contributions  are "rea- 
28.  Piacentini and Foley (1992, p. 284). 198  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Table 4.  Postretirement Health Insurance: Eligibility and Benefits 
Percent  of individuals 
Health insurance  Medium and  State and local 
characteristic  large  firms, 1989  government,  1990 
Eligibility 
All retirees  eligible  39  32 
Subject  to service requirement  29  39 
Must qualify  for pension  26  20 
Benefit  level 
No change in coverage  84  87 
Reduced  coverage  16  13 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics  (1989,  1991). 
sonable";  in 1990,  the median  contribution  for family coverage was $55 
for pre-65  retirees  and $31  for post-65  retirees.29 
Employer-provided  health insurance that is provided for retirees 
over age 65 must then be coordinated  with that  provided  by Medicare.30 
The least generous  plans simply  cover the retiree's  Medicare  Part  B pre- 
mium  or provide supplemental  "Medi-Gap"  type coverage, which pays 
for deductibles, copayments, and items such as prescription  drugs  not 
covered by Medicare.  But most firms  continue to include their  retirees 
over age 65 in their  regular  health  plan  for active employees and  retirees 
under age 65.31 
The cost to employers of providing  postretirement  health insurance 
depends  on several  factors  including  the method  used to coordinate  ben- 
efits and  the generosity  of the company's  health  plan. Because Medicare 
pays some of the costs for individuals  over age 65 that would otherwise 
be paid by firms, the most significant  determinant  of a firm's total ex- 
penditures on retirement health insurance is the number of retirees 
under  age 65. Expenditures  on retirees  under  age 65 are typically  double 
those on retirees  over age 65; in 1989,  the median  cost to firms  of provid- 
ing retiree health insurance to an individual  under age 65 was $2,246 
while that  for an individual  over age 65 was $1,033.  32 
29. Hewitt  Associates (1990,  p. 15). 
30. See de Lissovoy and others (1990)  for a good explanation  of the various  ways in 
which  firms  coordinate  benefits  with  the coverage  provided  by Medicare. 
31. A. Foster  Higgins  & Co., Inc. (1990). 
32. Hewitt  Associates (1990,  p. 12). Brigitte  C. Madrian  199 
Estimating the Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement 
This section of the paper  turns  to an estimation  of the relationship  be- 
tween retiree  health  insurance  and  retirement.  By reducing  the variance 
in postretirement  consumption  associated with uncertainty  about med- 
ical expenditures,  employer-provided  retiree  health  insurance  increases 
the attractiveness  of early retirement.  Those with retiree health insur- 
ance should be more likely to retire  in a given year than those without 
such coverage. Although  this effect should  be weaker  after  age 65, when 
all individuals  become eligible for Medicare, it will not entirely disap- 
pear unless Medicare is a perfect substitute for employer-provided 
health  insurance.3 
Estimation  Strategy 
To test for these effects, one would ideally follow a group  of not yet 
retired  individuals  over time to see whether  those with retiree  health  in- 
surance  were more likely to retire than those without such insurance. 
Unfortunately,  there  are  no longitudinal  data  currently  available  with in- 
formation  about  whether  the health  insurance  coverage  of working  indi- 
viduals will continue after retirement.34  There are several sources of 
data, however, that allow one to identify  whether  the health insurance 
coverage of those currently retired comes from a former employer. 
Thus, I look at the retirement  decision retrospectively  and consider  the 
effect of postretirement  health  insurance  on the age at retirement  among 
those already  retired.  The actual  equation  estimated  is of the form 
(1)  yi =  ixi  +  ?yRHIi  +  Ei,  Ei  -N(O,&  2), 
where yi is age at retirement,  xi is a vector of demographic  characteris- 
tics, and  RHIi is a dummy  variable  equal to one if the individual  has re- 
tiree health  insurance. 
33. This  is unlikely  to be true  since Medicare  coverage  is less generous  than  most em- 
ployer-provided  policies. On  average,  Medicare  covers only about  half  of the medical  ex- 
penses  of the elderly. 
34. The  new Health  and  Retirement  Survey  conducted  by the Survey  Research  Center 
at the University  of Michigan  is collecting  this type of information.  The first  wave of data 
is scheduled  to be released  later  this year.  To conduct  a longitudinal  analysis  of the retire- 
ment  decision,  however,  one would  have to wait until  late 1995  when the second wave of 
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This estimation  strategy  has one obvious problem:  one does not ob- 
serve the age at retirement  for those who are  not yet retired.  As is typical 
with this type of censoring, the forced exclusion of these individuals 
from  the regression  will tend to bias the estimated  coefficients. With  the 
upper  tail of the retirement  age distribution  truncated,  the average re- 
tirement  age in the remaining  sample  will be too low. In a univariate  set- 
ting (where postretirement  health insurance is the only variable that 
explains  retirement)  and  with  only one cohort  of individuals,  this trunca- 
tion will lead to an understatement  of the effect of retiree health insur- 
ance if such insurance  actually does raise the retirement  hazard  at all 
ages. This is because at every age, a higher  fraction  of those without  re- 
tiree health insurance will be excluded relative to those with retiree 
health  insurance,  leading  to a greater  downward  bias in the average  re- 
tirement  age for those without  retiree  health  insurance.  In a multivariate 
setting, however, and with many cohorts each truncated  at different 
ages, the direction  of the bias is not unambiguous. 
At younger  ages, this type of truncation  is substantial.  In the Current 
Population  Survey, only 24 percent of those aged 55-59 report  having 
ever retired;  the remaining  76 percent  are still working  and  would  there- 
fore have to be excluded  from  any estimation  of the average  age at retire- 
ment. Because the magnitude  of the bias decreases with  the age at which 
the truncation  takes place, one way to reduce the bias is to restrict  the 
sample  to cohorts for which a substantial  fraction  of individuals  has al- 
ready  retired.  For example, one could look only at individuals  over age 
70, an age at which 85 percent  of individuals  report  being  out of the labor 
force. Alternatively,  one can account for the truncation  directly in the 
estimation with standard  econometric techniques.3 (This procedure, 
called a truncated  regression,  is outlined  in the appendix.) 
A second potential  problem,  for both ordinary  least squares  estima- 
tion and  the truncated  regression  model, is that of mortality.  Only  those 
who are  alive when the data  are  collected are  included  in the sample,  and 
with  an older  sample  mortality  is considerable.  Of those individuals  who 
are 55 years old today, 83 percent  are expected to reach age 65; 54 per- 
cent are expected to reach age 75; and only 21 percent are expected to 
reach  age 85.36  Mortality  alone will not necessarily  lead to biased coeffi- 
35. See Hausman  and  Wise (1977)  and  Maddala  (1983). 
36. See Faber  (1982).  It is interesting  to note that the mortality  bias is less severe at 
younger  ages, but this is where  truncation  is most likely to be a problem.  Conversely,  at Brigitte C. Madrian  201 
cients, however. For example, if the mortality  that  occurs is completely 
random,  this will make  the data  more sparse  everywhere  but should  not 
bias the estimated  coefficients. 
Of  course, mortality  might  not be random.  In particular,  those in  poor 
health  are likely to die before those who are healthy, and there is much 
research  to suggest that individuals  in poor health  tend to retire  early.37 
If mortality  is only related  to E and not to retiree health insurance,  this 
will bias the estimate of the constant but will not affect the estimated 
slope parameters.  The potential  problem  arises when premature  mortal- 
ity is more  likely among  those who retire  early and who do not have re- 
tiree health  insurance.  This type of differential  mortality  could be possi- 
ble if retiree health insurance improves access  to  health care and 
consequently  reduces the risk of early death. In this case, the estimated 
effect of retiree  health  insurance  on age at retirement  will be too large.38 
A growing  body of evidence suggests that income and mortality  are 
negatively correlated.39  Insofar  as retiree health insurance  and income 
are  positively correlated,  this bias may  be present.  Explicitly  accounting 
for this bias, however, would entail  estimating  the relationship  between 
retiree health insurance and mortality, something that is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  The extent of this bias may  be moderated  by the fact 
that most mortality  occurs after age 65, and all individuals  by this time 
have access to Medicare. 
A third  bias could arise if individuals  select jobs precisely because 
they provide health insurance  for early retirement.  There are two fac- 
tors, however, that mitigate  the potential  severity of this bias. The first 
is that a large  fraction  of individuals  simply do not know whether  their 
job provides retiree health  insurance  until they get close to retirement. 
The August 1988  Current  Population  Survey asked individuals  over age 
40 with employer-provided  health  insurance  whether  their  health  insur- 
older  ages, where  the selection  resulting  from  mortality  is substantial,  there is much  less 
truncation. 
37. See, for example,  Bazzoli  (1985),  Sammartino  (1987),  and  Burtless  (1987). 
38. If  this  bias  is present,  the growth  over  time  in the availability  of retiree  health  insur- 
ance shown  in figures  2 and  3 will be understated. 
39. Most of the evidence on this front is found in the demography  and public  health 
literature.  See Smith  and  Egger  (1992)  and  Wilkinson  (1992)  for  commentaries  on this liter- 
ature  and  for references  to other papers  on the topic of demographic  characteristics  and 
differential  mortality.  In the economics  literature,  this issue has been addressed  by Jiana- 
koplos,  Menchick,  and  Irvine  (1989)  and  McClellan  and  Skinner  (1992). 202  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Figure 4.  Tenure at  Retirement 
Percent  of individuals 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  using  data  from  the  Survey  of  Income  and  Program Participation  for  men  who 
participated in the Characteristics  of the Job from Which Retired module (SIPP-CJR). 
ance would continue should they retire. One-third  of those aged 40-44 
did not know and, even more striking,  one-quarter  of those aged 60-64 
did not know. (Of  course, to the extent that  individuals  are unaware  that 
their  employer  provides  retiree  health  benefits,  the impact  of such bene- 
fits on the retirement  decision will be reduced.) The second factor is 
that, as shown in figure  4, individuals  typically held the  job from which 
they eventually retired  for decades.40  While possible, it is unlikely  that 
individuals  are selecting  jobs on the basis of retiree health  insurance,  a 
benefit  they are not likely to receive for 20 or 30 years and  which, in con- 
trast  to pension benefits, the firm  has no legal requirement  to provide. 
Data 
To estimate the effect of health insurance  on retirement,  I use three 
different  data sources. The first, the 1987  NMES, collected detailed in- 
formation  about health status, health insurance,  and medical  care utili- 
40. Author's  calculation  using  data  from  the SIPP-CJR  sample  described  below. Brigitte C. Madrian  203 
zation  from  approximately  14,000  households. It also collected some in- 
formation about current and past labor force participation and, in 
particular,  asked all individuals  over age 55 whether they had retired 
from  ajob or business. The disadvantage  of the NMES is that  there  is no 
information  on either  pension  or social security  recipiency. 
The second two sources of data are supplements  to the SIPP, a na- 
tionally representative  survey of households designed to collect infor- 
mation  on the economic and demographic  characteristics  of individuals 
and their families. Survey participants are interviewed every four 
months for roughly two-and-one-half  years and asked a set of "core" 
questions pertaining  to their  labor  market  activity, income, and partici- 
pation  in welfare  and transfer  programs  over the previous  four months. 
These quarterly  interviews  are referred  to as "waves."  In addition,  sup- 
plemental  questions, which change  from  wave to wave, are asked in so- 
called topical modules. I use information  from two different topical 
modules. 
Wave 3 of the 1984  SIPP panel included  a topical module  on Educa- 
tion and  Work  History;  I refer  to this as the SIPP-EWH  data  set. As part 
of this topical module, individuals  who did not work during  the four- 
month  reference period were asked in what year they last worked, the 
industry  of their  former  employer  and their occupation  while working, 
and the reason (including  retirement)  for leaving  their  former  job. Addi- 
tional  information  on retirement  is found in the topical  module  on Char- 
acteristics  of Job from Which  Retired, which was incorporated  into the 
1984,  1985,  and 1986  panels  of the SIPP;41  this is referred  to as the SIPP- 
CJR data set. In this topical module, questions concerning  retirement 
were asked only of those receiving  retirement  income other than social 
security. Much more information  on the former  job is available, how- 
ever. In addition  to the year the last worked, the industry  of their  former 
employer, and their occupation while working, this topical module in- 
cludes questions on firm  size, usual hours worked, earnings  before re- 
tirement,  and on whether  pension benefits  were based on contributions 
or years of service and  pay and  whether  an individual  is now covered by 
a health  plan  provided  by a former  employer. 
Because the samples of individuals covered by these two topical 
modules  differ,  I treat  the SIPP-EWH  and  the SIPP-CJR  data sets sepa- 
41.  Specifically,  I refer to 1984 wave 4, 1985 wave 7, and 1986 wave 4. 204  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
rately.42  The SIPP-CJR  sample is larger because it pools individuals 
from  three different  panels. It is confined, however, to those who have 
received  pension income. The SIPP-EWH  sample,  in contrast,  includes 
everyone who did not work in the previous  four months  and  is therefore 
more  representative.  For both samples, I know from the core question- 
naire  whether  an individual  is covered by health  insurance  through  a for- 
mer employer  and the amount  of pension and social security  income an 
individual  is receiving.  The supplementary  questions  in the topical  mod- 
ules provide  information  on when individuals  retired. 
In all three  data  sets, the samples  consist of men  aged  55-84. I confine 
the analysis to men largely because the retirement  decision for men 
seems more  well defined,  especially since I am looking  at retirement  ret- 
rospectively, including  time periods in which the labor  force participa- 
tion of women was at a much lower level than it is today. This is also 
consistent with most of the previous  literature  on retirement,  which has 
tended  to focus exclusively on men (although  there  is an emerging  litera- 
ture on the retirement  of women and the joint retirement  decisions of 
husbands  and wives). The lower-age cutoff is dictated by the NMES, 
which asks retirement  questions only of those over age 55 (in general, 
very few individuals  retire before age 55). The upper-age  cutoff is dic- 
tated by the SIPP, which topcodes its age variable  at 85. The appendix 
contains  descriptive  statistics  for individuals  from all three samples. 
As in any study  of the retirement  decision, the first  question  to be ad- 
dressed  is how to define  retirement.  In the previous  literature,  which  has 
looked mostly  at retirement  in a dynamic  framework,  all of the following 
definitions  have been used: (1) a "permanent"  departure  from  the labor 
force; (2) a substantial  reduction  in the usual number  of hours  worked; 
(3) self-reported  retirement;  and (4) receipt  of pension or social security 
benefits. The definition  chosen is often guided  by the data at hand. Un- 
fortunately,  it is not possible to get a definition  of retirement  that  is com- 
pletely consistent  across all three  data  sets, which  means  that  the results 
from the different data sets are not strictly comparable.  The various 
definitions  of retirement  do, however, create a way to check the ro- 
bustness of the results. 
Because the estimation results are not particularly  sensitive to the 
42. Note that  those individuals  in the 1984  panel  who were not working  in wave 3 and 
who  received  some pension  income  in wave 4 will be in both  the SIPP-EWH  and  the SIPP- 
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definition  of retirement  that  is chosen, I focus on one definition  of retire- 
ment for each data set. In the NMES, retirement  is defined as having 
ever retired  and not currently  working. In the SIPP-EWH  sample, re- 
tirement  is defined  as not working  and being out of the labor  force. And 
in the SIPP-CJR  sample, retirement  is defined  as receipt of pension in- 
come and  not working.  (The  appendix  compares  the results  for each data 
set using various  different  definitions  of retirement.) 
In this paper,  the variable  of interest  in explaining  the retirement  deci- 
sion is whether  an individual  has retiree  health  insurance.  In the NMES, 
this is defined  by a question specifically  about retiree  health  insurance. 
In both of the SIPP samples, receipt of retiree health insurance  is in- 
ferred  from  questions  about  whether  an individual  is covered  by any pri- 
vate health  insurance,  whether  this policy is held in the individual's  own 
name, and whether it comes from a current  or former employer. For 
older  individuals  who are not working,  it is likely  that  any employer-pro- 
vided  coverage  held in the individual's  own name  is from  a retiree  health 
insurance policy.43  The appendix discusses  the precise definition of re- 
tiree health insurance  in greater  detail and compares these two defini- 
tions of having  retiree  health  insurance. 
The other  explanatory  variables  used in the regressions  include  race, 
education,  industry,  and occupation  (although  industry  and occupation 
are not available  for the 1984  panel in the SIPP-CJR  sample).  I also use 
some of the pension information  in the SIPP-CJR  data. All regressions 
include a full set of age dummies  to account for any cohort effects that 
might  be present. Without  these age dummies,  the coefficient  on retiree 
health insurance  could be picking up a spurious  correlation  between a 
secular  trend  toward  earlier  retirement  and the increased  availability  of 
retiree  health  insurance  over the same time period. 
Empirical Results 
Table  5 shows the results  from  a regression  of age at retirement  on the 
regressors  outlined  above using  data  from  the NMES. The first  column, 
which presents  the results  from an ordinary  least squares  regression,  is 
43. For some retirees, this coverage could be COBRA coverage (or continuation 
coverage  under  a state law in effect before COBRA).  Individuals  cease to be eligible  for 
COBRA,  however,  once they are  entitled  to Medicare.  So for  older  retirees,  this  definition 
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Table 5.  Postretirement Health Insurance and the Age at Retirement (NMES)a 
Ordinary 
least  squiares  Trutincated  r-egression 
Age  group,  No  induistry anid  No  induistty and  Industty  and 
independent  variable,  occupationi  occupation  occuipation 
and summary statistic  duimmies  dumnmies  duimmies 
Ages  55-84b 
Constant  56.230  61.456  61.040 
(0.947)  (2.032)  (2.064) 
Retiree health insurance  -  1.187  -  1.400  -  1.215 
(0.185)  (0.217)  (0.224) 
Education  0.098  0.113  0.116 
(0.028)  (0.033)  (0.038) 
Black  0.194  0.237  0.208 
(0.307)  (0.368)  (0.370) 
R  2  0.253  ... 
Log likelihood  -4,091.9  -4,007.4  -4,000.4 
Ages  6584b 
Constant  61.375  63.065  62.838 
(0.932)  (1.324)  (1.399) 
Retiree health insurance  -  1.320  -1.481  -1.286 
(0.202)  (0.225)  (0.232) 
Education  0.102  0.113  0.119 
(0.031)  (0.034)  (0.039) 
Black  0.267  0.302  0.309 
(0.347)  (0.390)  (0.392) 
R2  0.149  ... 
Log likelihood  -3,662.5  -3,622.2  -3,614.2 
Ages  7084b 
Constant  61.710  61.904  61.976 
(0.904)  (0.955)  (1.136) 
Retiree health insurance  -  1.471  -  1.522  -  1.307 
(0.269)  (0.277)  (0.287) 
Education  0.157  0.162  0.158 
(0.041)  (0.042)  (0.048) 
Black  0.363  0.382  0.410 
(0.476)  (0.490)  (0.490) 
R2  0.113  ...  . 
Log likelihood  -2,538.0  -2,532.8  -2,526.2 
Source:  Author's  regressions  using data from the  1987 National  Medical Expenditure  Survey. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  age  at  retirement.  All  specifications  include  a  complete  set  of  cohort  dummies. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b.  The full sample consists  of  1,539 men, aged 55-84,  who reported ever having retired. There are 1,359 men who 
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subject  to the truncation  bias  discussed earlier  because age at retirement 
is observed only for those who have actually  retired.  These coefficients 
are  presented  for the sake of comparison  with the coefficients  in the sec- 
ond column, in which the truncation  is explicitly accounted for in the 
estimation.  The first  column  of the top section, which uses the full sam- 
ple, shows that  in the ordinary  least squares  specification  retiree  health 
insurance  reduces  the age at retirement  by a little more  than  a year. This 
effect is statistically  significant  with a t-statistic  of 6.7. Education  has a 
positive and  significant  effect on the age at retirement,  with  an additional 
year of school increasing  the retirement  age by about a month. Being 
black  has a positive but insignificant  effect on the age at retirement. 
Explicitly  accounting  for the truncation  in the data, as is done in the 
second column, increases the magnitude  of all the coefficients. This is 
consistent with the notion that truncation  leads to a downward  bias in 
the coefficients. The impact  of retiree  health  insurance  on the age at re- 
tirement is about 20 percent greater in the truncated  regression than 
under ordinary least squares, reducing the age at retirement  by 1.4 
years.  Not  surprisingly, a  specification test  rejects ordinary least 
squares  in favor of the truncated  regression  model.44 
To further  illustrate  the effects of truncation,  the next two sections of 
table 5 restrict the sample to older ages: those aged 65 and older and 
those aged 70 and older. The substantial  increase in the coefficients on 
retiree health insurance  in the first column confirms  the assertion that 
the truncation  in the data leads to biased coefficients when using ordi- 
nary least squares. The problem  with truncation  is less severe at older 
ages and, as expected, the ordinary  least squares  and truncated  regres- 
sion coefficients are less disparate  in the 65-84 sample than in the full 
sample.  When  the sample  is restricted  to ages 70-84, the two sets of co- 
efficients  are very similar,  although  the likelihood  ratio  test still rejects 
the ordinary  least squares model in favor of the truncated  regression 
model.  The effect of retiree  health  insurance  increases slightly  when the 
44. The  test whether  the truncation  in the data  creates  a substantial  bias  in the ordinary 
least squares  coefficient  estimates  is a test of the significance  of the inverse Mill's ratio 
[ -  cx)/c(cx)]  in the ordinary  least squares  regression 
y; =  xi +  +yRHI;  + 8 ( (OL) +  ei, 
where  (x;  = (agei -  1'x; -  -yRHI,)lo.  In this regression,  the t-statistic  on the coefficient  8 
equals  3.57, which  suggests  that  the truncation  does indeed  matter. 208  B-ookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
sample  is restricted  to this older group, reducing  the age at retirement 
by about 1.5 years. 
To the extent that the bias associated with truncation  is remedied  by 
explicitly accounting  for it in the estimation, the increase in the retiree 
health insurance  coefficient in the second column, as the sample is re- 
stricted  to older  ages, is consistent with the notion  that  differential  mor- 
tality leads to an upward  bias in the coefficients, a problem  that would 
be more  severe in an older sample. However, the effect of retiree  health 
insurance  is only slightly larger  when the sample is confined to those 
aged  70-84 relative  to that  obtained  using  the full sample,  suggesting  that 
the size of the mortality  bias is not large. 
One concern with interpreting  the coefficient  on retiree  health  insur- 
ance in these specifications  is that the model omits many variables  that 
may be correlated  with retiree health insurance. Chief among them is 
pensions. As table 3 showed, the industries  that tend to offer retiree 
health insurance  also tend to offer pensions. However, as noted previ- 
ously, none of the data  sets with good health  insurance  information  con- 
tains the detailed  data on pension incentives that would be helpful  in a 
retirement  model. The NMES, with absolutely no information  on pen- 
sions, is the worst offender. 
The third  column  of table 5 attempts  to partially  address  this concern 
by including  a set of industry  and occupation  dummies  in the truncated 
regression  model. Not surprisingly,  the coefficient on retiree  health  in- 
surance  falls when industry  and  occupation  controls  are  present.  The ef- 
fect of retiree health insurance, however, is still large and statistically 
significant, reducing the age at retirement by  1.3 years for the two 
subsamples.  These results suggest, therefore,  that there is a significant 
correlation  between the availability  of retiree  health  insurance  and  early 
retirement. In the two subsamples, those with retiree health insur- 
ance retire about 16 months before those without retiree health in- 
surance, even after controlling  for industry  and occupation, which are 
likely correlated  with other pension incentives that similarly  encourage 
early  retirement. 
Table  6 presents results analogous  to those in table 5 using the SIPP- 
EWH  sample.  Once  again,  the effects of truncation  are  readily  apparent. 
For the full sample, the coefficient  on retiree  health  insurance  is - 0.39 
under ordinary  least squares and - 0.63 in the truncated regression 
model.  In  both  cases, these effects are significant,  although  they are sub- Brigitte C. Madrian  209 
Table 6.  Postretirement Health Insurance and the Age at Retirement (SIPP-EWH)a 
Tri-i cated  r-egr-ession 
Age  group, 
inidepenident  variable,  Ordinary least  Fuill  Those  with 
and summary statistic  squiares  samnple  penision inicomtie 
Ages  55-84b 
Constant  56.143  66.627  63.307 
(0.552)  (1.798)  (1.668) 
Retiree health insurance  -  0.388  -0.627  -  0.634 
(0.183)  (0.275)  (0.294) 
Education  0.080  0.115  0.109 
(0.024)  (0.035)  (0.041) 
Black  0.163  0.314  1.145 
(0.330)  (0.490)  (0.556) 
R  2  0.348  . ..  ... 
Log  likelihood  -  5,524.2  -  5,209.2  -  2,833.0 
Sample size  2,009  2,009  1,146 
Ages  65-84 
Constant  60.870  64.139  62.843 
(0.543)  (0.936)  (0.992) 
Retiree health insurance  -0.586  -  0.794  -  0.697 
(0.221)  (0.291)  (0.309) 
Education  0.094  0.123  0.129 
(0.029)  (0.037)  (0.043) 
Black  0.278  0.402  1.211 
(0.392)  (0.518)  (0.589) 
R'  20.198  .  .  . 
Log likelihood  -4,610.7  -  4,482.5  -  2,351.1 
Sample size  1,630  1,630  891 
Ages  70-84 
Constant  62.760  63.805  63.570 
(0.611)  (0.753)  (0.851) 
Retiree health insurance  -  1.084  -  1.249  -  1.087 
(0.313)  (0.356)  (0.383) 
Education  0.112  0.127  0.149 
(0.039)  (0.044)  (0.053) 
Black  0.375  0.428  1.056 
(0.549)  (0.630)  (0.695) 
R  2  0.137  ... 
Log likelihood  -  3,166.0  -  3,136.2  -  1,569.2 
Sample size  1,076  1,076  561 
Source:  Author's  regressions  using data from the  1984 Survey  of Income  and Program Participation (wave  3) for 
men who  participated in the Education  and Work History  module (SIPP-EWH). 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  age  at  retirement.  All  specifications  include  a  complete  set  of  cohort  dummies. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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stantially  lower than those obtained  from the NMES. The coefficients 
become larger,  however, as the sample is restricted  to older ages, and 
the coefficient  in the truncated  regression  model  for those aged 70-84 is 
close to that obtained in the NMES (-  1.25 versus  -  1.52). This suggests 
that, in this sample, either the truncated  regression model may not be 
completely capturing  the effects of the truncation  or the bias resulting 
from  differential  mortality  is greater  than in the NMES. The true effect 
probably  lies somewhere  between the - 0.63 coefficient obtained  from 
the truncated  regression  on the full sample  and  the -  1.25  coefficient  ob- 
tained  from the sample  restricted  to those aged 70-84. 
The third  column of table 6 restricts  the sample  to those who are re- 
ceiving pension income. This is done both to enhance comparability 
with the SIPP-CJR  sample, which includes only those with pension in- 
come, and to control for the effect of pensions. This restriction  on the 
sample does not substantively  change the coefficients. Note that when 
the sample  is confined  to those who are receiving  a pension, the effect of 
retiree  health  insurance  cannot  be entirely  attributed  to an omitted  pen- 
sion bias. Even among  those with pensions, having  retiree  health  insur- 
ance decreases the age at retirement  by 7 to 12  months. 
Results using the SIPP-CJR  sample are presented in table 7. Once 
again, the truncated  regression  coefficients on retiree health insurance 
are larger than the ordinary least squares coefficients and increase 
slightly  as the sample  is restricted  to older ages. When  industry  and oc- 
cupation  dummies  are included,  the coefficients  imply  a reduction  in the 
age at retirement  of five to six months, a result smaller  than that using 
the NMES data but consistent with that from the SIPP-EWH  sample. 
Because this sample  is composed entirely  of individuals  receiving  a pen- 
sion, these results  are  less likely to be subject  to an omitted  pension  bias. 
Industry  and occupation  controls  are added  in the third  column. The in- 
dustry  and  occupation  codes in the CJR  topical  module  are not available 
in the 1984  panel of the SIPP, so the sample  in the third  columnn  of table 
7 is confined  to those in the 1985  and 1986  panels of the SIPP; sample 
sizes are thus substantially  smaller  than in the first  two columns. When 
industry  and  occupation  controls  are included,  the coefficient  on retiree 
health  insurance  falls somewhat, although  it remains  marginally  signifi- 
cant, and  implies  a reduction  in the age at retirement  of five months. 
An alternative  approach  to examining  the effect of health insurance 
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Table 7.  Postretirement Health Insurance and the Age at Retirement (SIPP-CJR)a 
Ordinary 
least squares  Tr-uncated  regression 
Age group,  No induistry  and  No indust,y and  Industry  and 
intdepenident  variable,  occupation  occiupation  occupation 
and summary  statistic  dummies  duimmies  dummies 
Ages 55-84b 
Constant  56.797  63.177  62.896 
(0.479)  (1.153)  (1.718) 
Retiree health insurance  -  0.570  -0.723  -0.451 
(0.150)  (0.193)  (0.256) 
Education  0.017  0.022  0.021 
(0.021)  (0.027)  (0.043) 
Black  0.528  0.734  0.345 
(0.292)  (0.395)  (0.566) 
R2  0.271  ...  ... 
Log likelihood  -  5,864.5  -5,582.4  -3,132.4 
Sample  size  2,243  2,243  1,210 
Ages  65-84 
Constant  61.767  63.749  63.971 
(0.454)  (0.636)  (1.069) 
Retiree health insurance  -  0.687  -  0.793  -0.514 
(0.173)  (0.200)  (0.267) 
Education  0.027  0.031  0.021 
(0.025)  (0.028)  (0.046) 
Black  0.794  0.945  0.715 
(0.358)  (0.421)  (0.612) 
R2  0.110  ...  ... 
Log likelihood  -4,770.6  -4,694.7  -2,538.5 
Sample  size  1,784  1,784  971 
Ages  70-84 
Constant  63.013  63,330  63.114 
(0.491)  (0.524)  (1.046) 
Retiree health insurance  -0.819  -0.854  -0.415 
(0.231)  (0.240)  (0.311) 
Education  0.039  0.040  -  0.002 
(0.032)  (0.033)  (0.054) 
Black  1.067  1.127  0.909 
(0.484)  (0.506)  (0.730) 
R2  0.075  ... 
Log likelihood  -  3,211.4  -  3,203.3  -1,760.1 
Sample size  1,163  1,163  649 
Source: Author's  regressions  using data from the Survey of Income and Program  Participation  for men who 
participated  in the Characteristics  of Job from  Which  Retired  module  (SIPP-CJR). 
a. The dependent  variable  is age at retirement.  All specifications  include  a complete set of cohort dummies. 
Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
b. The full sample  consists  of men aged 55-84 who report  receiving  pension  income. 212  Brookings  Paper-s  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Table 8.  Postretirement Health Insurance and the Probability of Early Retirementa 
Survey of Income  and  National  Medical  Prga  Patcpto 
Independent  var  iable  Expenditure  Pi-ogi-am Patltcpation 
and slumnnaty  statistic  Slurvey  EWH  CJR 
Constant  1.220  0.389  0.605 
(0.329)  (0.169)  (0.166) 
Retiree health insurance  0.428  0.202  0.173 
(0.089)  (0.087)  (0.079) 
Education  -  0.051  -  0.014  -0.017 
(0.014)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Black  -  0.240  -  0.100  -0.410 
(0.158)  (0.151)  (0.159) 
Log likelihood  -  581.8  707.7  -  733.4 
Sample size  914  1,076  1,163 
Source:  Author's  regressions  using data from the  1987 NMES  and the two  supplements  to the SIPP. 
a.  The  table  presents  results  from estimating  a probit equation  for whether  an individual  retired before  age  65. 
The sample consists  of men aged 70-84.  All specifications  include a complete  set of cohort dummies.  Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
ance on the likelihood of "early" retirement.  In the retirement  litera- 
ture, "early" typically  refers  to retirement  before  age 65, the "normal" 
retirement  age according  to social security  policies. Age 65 is also a nat- 
ural  breakpoint  because this is the age at which  individuals  become eligi- 
ble for Medicare. 
The results  from  estimating  a probit  equation  for whether  an individ- 
ual retires  before age 65 are shown in table 8. Because truncation  is still 
an issue, the sample  is restricted  to individuals  aged 70-84. The sign on 
the retiree  health  insurance  coefficient  is positive because health  insur- 
ance now serves to increase the likelihood  of early retirement  (whereas 
in the previous three tables it decreased the age at retirement).  The re- 
sults in the first column, using the NMES data, suggest that retiree 
health  insurance  increases the probability  of early retirement  by about 
15 percentage  points.45  For the SIPP-EWH  sample in the second col- 
umn, the coefficient on retiree health insurance  implies an increase in 
the probability  of early retirement of approximately  7.5 percentage 
points. Although  not shown, this effect does not appear  to differ  on the 
basis of receiving  pension income. These results are similar  to those in 
45. The increase  in the probability  is calculated  as the average  across  all individuals  in 
the sample  of the difference  between the predicted  probabilities  of early retirement  with 
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Table 9.  Differences in Pensions for Those with and without Retiree Health Insurance 
Dollars  or percent 
Full samplea  Ages  70-84 
With  Without  With  Without 
retiree health  retiree health  retiree health  retiree health 
Pension  characteristic  insurance  insurance  insurance  insurance 
Average  social  security 
amount  545  552  555  559 
Average  pension  amount  761  424  616  363 
Percent that received 
cost-of-living  adjustment  51.4  35.0  67.1  41.6 
Percent with defined 
contribution plan  8.9  13.3  10.2  13.9 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based on the Survey  of Income  and Program Participation (SIPP-CJR). 
a.  The full sample includes  men aged 55-84  who reported receiving  pension  income. 
the column  for the SIPP-CJR  sample  in which  the coefficient  implies  that 
retiree  health  insurance  increases  the probability  of retirement  by about 
6 percentage  points. 
Overall,  the  results  in tables  5-8  support  the  conclusion  that  retiree 
health  insurance  is a strong  predictor  of  early  retirement.  Having  such 
health  insurance  significantly  increases  the probability  of retiring  before 
age  65.  It  also  decreases  the  age  at  retirement  by  between  6  and  14 
months,  although  taken  together  the  coefficients  suggest  an  effect  of 
about  1 year. 
Pensions  and  Retiree  Health  Insurance 
The  result  that  retiree  health  insurance  has  a significant  negative  im- 
pact  on  age  at  retirement  even  among  those  receiving  pensions  lends 
some  support  to the  argument  that  the  effect  of retiree  health  insurance 
is  not  simply  a pension  effect;  however,  the  evidence  is  by  no  means 
conclusive.  It is possible  that,  within  the  set  of  firms  that  provide  pen- 
sions,  those  who  provide  retiree  health  insurance  have  pension  incen- 
tives  that  induce  early  retirement  as  well.  Without  information  on  the 
specific  details  of  these  pension  plans,  I cannot  directly  test  for  this.  I 
can,  however,  examine  whether  the  pensions  received  by  individuals 
with  retiree  health  insurance  are different. 
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social security  payments  received by individuals  in the SIPP-CJR  sam- 
ple (all  of whom have pensions). The first  row shows that  average  social 
security  payments  received by individuals  with retiree  health  insurance 
are virtually  identical to those received by individuals  without retiree 
health insurance.  Although  social security is not a perfect indicator  of 
preretirement  income (and is somewhat endogenous to the decision of 
when  to retire),  these numbers  suggest  that  the wage component  of com- 
pensation  is similar  for jobs with and without retiree  health insurance. 
The nonwage component of compensation, however, may be quite 
different.  The second row of table 9 shows that the average  pension re- 
ceived by individuals  with retiree  health insurance  is $250-$350  higher 
than that received by individuals without retiree health insurance. 
Moreover, individuals  with retiree health insurance  are more likely to 
have received a cost-of-living adjustment  to their pension (which par- 
tially  accounts  for the difference  in pension  amounts  in the second row). 
These last two findings  suggest that  firms  that offer retiree  health  insur- 
ance provide  more  generous  pension benefits  as well. 
One possible way to skirt  the problem  of whether  firms  that provide 
retiree  health  insurance  also provide  pension incentives  for early retire- 
ment is to look at individuals  who participated  in defined  contribution 
plans. The SIPP-CJR  data  record  whether  a retiree's  pension  was based 
on "years of service and pay" (defined  benefit)  or on the "amount  con- 
tributed to  [the] plan" (defined contribution). Defined contribution 
plans  do not typically  include  the incentives  for retirement  at particular 
ages characteristic  of many  defined  benefit  plans.46 
Table 10  compares  the effect of retiree  health  insurance  on age at re- 
tirement for those in defined benefit and defined contribution  plans. 
While  the coefficient  on retiree  health  insurance  is negative and signifi- 
cant for those in defined  benefit  pension plans, it is positive and signifi- 
cant for those in defined  contribution  plans (despite a 90 percent  reduc- 
tion in sample size). This result is somewhat  troubling.  It is difficult  to 
believe that retiree  health  insurance  actually  increases  the age at retire- 
ment  by almost 18  months. 
There are at least two interpretations  of this surprising  result. The 
first  is that  health  insurance  does not really  affect  retirement  and  that  the 
coefficient  on retiree  health insurance  estimated  for those with defined 
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Table 10.  Postretirement Health Insurance, the Age at Retirement, and Pensionsa 
Independent  variable  Defined  benefit  Defined  contribution 
and summary statistic  pension  pension 
Constant  62.761  59.943 
(0.881)  (3.162) 
Retiree  health insurance  -  0.648  1.433 
(0.186)  (0.580) 
Education  0.004  0.139 
(0.025)  (0.081) 
Black  0.299  3.014 
(0.376)  (1.096) 
Log likelihood  -  5,807.8  -  680.8 
Sample size  2,381  276 
Source:  Author's  regressions  using data from the Survey  of Income  and Program Participation (SIPP-CJR). The 
sample  includes  men aged 55-84  who  reported receiving  pension  income. 
a.  The table presents  results from estimating a truncated regression  model in which the dependent  variable is the 
age at retirement.  All specifications  include a complete  set of cohort dummies.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
benefit pension plans is purely a pension effect. However, even if it is 
true  that  firms  offering  retiree  health  insurance  also offer  defined  benefit 
pension  plans that  encourage  early  retirement,  why should  these partic- 
ular  firms  offer retiree  health insurance?  If the answer is that firms  can 
make  the early  retirement  incentives in their  pensions operative  only by 
offering  retiree  health  insurance,  then  health  insurance  matters  in the re- 
tirement  decision even if its provision is correlated  with pension ben- 
efits. 
A second interpretation  of the positive retiree  health  insurance  coef- 
ficient for those with defined  contribution  pensions is that it is picking 
up the fact that those firms that provide retiree health insurance are 
"better" employers, and individuals  are therefore  more likely to defer 
retirement.  To the extent that this bias is present in the previously  pre- 
sented  empirical  work, it makes  the negative  coefficient  on retiree  health 
insurance  in all the other specifications  more striking. 
The right  conclusion to draw  from table 10, however, is that further 
research  on the relationship  between pensions and retiree  health  insur- 
ance is warranted.  Little is known  about  how firms  design  their  compen- 
sation  packages.  To the extent that  firms  design their  benefits  packages 
to meet certain  objectives, such as early retirement,  understanding  the 
correlation  between  types of benefits  is important.  Integrating  pensions, 
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tirement  decision is the next step in evaluating  how health  insurance  af- 
fects retirement. 
Assessing the Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement 
Previous  cautions aside, this section of the paper  uses the estimates 
derived  earlier  of the effect of retiree  health  insurance  on the age at and 
probability  of early  retirement  to answer  three  important  questions.  The 
first question, of great interest to both policymakers  and academic re- 
searchers, is what will be the impact of health care reform on retire- 
ment?  Although  the empirical  work  in this paper  can be used only to ad- 
dress the possible supply  responses, I discuss other  responses that may 
occur as well. The second question  is the extent to which the increased 
availability  of retiree  health insurance  can explain  the decreasing  labor 
force participation  of older  workers  over the past few decades. Previous 
work on pensions and social security suggests that, together, they ex- 
plain between one-third  and one-half of this decline; the results in this 
paper suggest that retiree health insurance  may be responsible  for an- 
other 10 to 20 percent. Finally, I examine whether the availability  of 
Medicare  can explain the "excess" retirement  that occurs at age 65. I 
find  little evidence that  Medicare  is important. 
Impact  of Health  Care Reform on Retirement 
Given the current  interest in health care reform, what implications 
can be drawn  from  the results  in this paper  about  the potential  labor  mar- 
ket effects of the various  proposals?  The most natural  reform  to consider 
would  be a move to universal  health  care. Table 11  illustrates  the conse- 
quences of such a step based on the assumption  that universal  health 
care would reduce the retirement  age of those currently  without  retiree 
health  insurance  by one year.47  The effect on the labor  force participa- 
47. The effect on the labor  force participation  rate  in table 11  is computed  as follows. 
I calculated  the actual  distribution  of retirement  ages for individuals  over age 70 in the 
NMES  data  with  and  without  retiree  health  insurance  and  the age-specific  labor  force par- 
ticipation  rates  that  these distributions  implied.  I then shifted  the retirement  age distribu- 
tion forward  by one year for those without  retiree  health  insurance  and  recalculated  the 
labor  force participation  rate. The decline in the labor  force participation  rate was then 
recalibrated  to be consistent with the official  labor  force participation  rate published  in 
U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Employment and Earnings, June 1987  (which  is reported 
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Table 11.  Effect of Universal Coverage on Labor Force Participation 
Units  as indicated 
Male  Labor-  force  Effect  of universal  coverage 
population  participation 
in 1987  rate  Participation  Total 
Age  (millions)  (percent)  /ate  (percent)  employment 
50-54  5.265  89.2  -0.35  -  18,541 
55-59  5.247  80.4  -  1.26  -  65,875 
60-64  5.020  55.6  -  4.27  -  214,181 
65-69  4.393  25.5  -  3.49  -  153,267 
Source:  Author's calculations  using data from the  1987 National  Medical Expenditure  Survey.  See text for further 
details. 
tion rate of men is shown in the third  column  and  the absolute  decline in 
employment  in the fourth  column. The effect is largest,  both in percent- 
age and  absolute  terms,  for those aged 60-64. Universal  coverage  would 
reduce  the labor  force participation  rate  of this group  by 4.27 percentage 
points, a 7.7 percent reduction  from the baseline rate of 55.6 percent. 
The overall  reduction  in employment  for men  aged  50-69 would  be about 
450,000. A more conservative  estimate of the effect of retiree  health  in- 
surance on retirement-for example, six months rather  than a year- 
would imply  a smaller  reduction  in employment. 
As noted in the introduction,  the actual effects on retirement  of any 
particular  health  care proposal  will depend on the specific nature  of the 
incentives  contained  in that  proposal.  The effects of employer-provided 
retiree health insurance estimated in this paper may therefore apply 
more  readily  to some plans than  to others. The type of health  insurance 
that would be available  to early retirees under  the Clinton  plan is fairly 
similar  to the employer-provided  retiree health insurance  examined in 
this paper. Under the Clinton  plan, individuals  between ages 55 and 64 
who are not working  are counted as early retirees. Since very few indi- 
viduals  retire  before age 55, this type of "eligibility"  requirement  is not 
very restrictive  and, if anything,  is less likely to be binding  than  the eligi- 
bility requirements  imposed by employers. The actual coverage under 
the Clinton  plan is quite generous and on par with that offered  by most 
large  businesses. And, because the government  subsidizes  80 percent  of 
the cost for early retirees under  the plan, the actual out-of-pocket  cost 
to individuals  is similar  to that  of most employer-provided  retiree  health 
insurance  coverage, for which employers typically continue to pay a 
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While  the numbers  estimated  in this paper  give some measure  of the 
likely supply  response that would follow if generous  low-cost health  in- 
surance  coverage  were made  available  to all early  retirees, they may  not 
give the actual change in the employment  of older workers that would 
result  if there  were demand  responses or other  changes  in the labor  mar- 
ket as well. For example, some reform  proposals  would  community-rate 
health  insurance  premiums.  This implies  that the young, with relatively 
low medical  expenditures,  would subsidize the premiums  of those who 
are older. If employers must pay for some portion  of health insurance 
premiums,  then, for those employers  who are now providing  health in- 
surance, community-rating  will make older workers relatively less ex- 
pensive to hire than under  the current  system in which employers pay 
the full health  insurance  costs of hiring  older individuals.  To the extent 
that this increases the demand  for older workers, the effect of health 
care reform  on the employment  of older  workers  will be overstated. 
For those employers who are not currently  providing  health insur- 
ance, requiring  employers to pay for some portion  of their employees' 
premiums  may decrease the demand  for older workers. The decreased 
demand,  however, will depend  on the degree  to which  the increased  cost 
associated with paying  for health insurance  is offset by a decline in the 
wages that workers  are willing  to accept because they value the provi- 
sion of health  insurance.  Empirical  evidence on the effects of other  man- 
dates has concluded  that  most of the cost to employers  of providing  ben- 
efits shows up as lower wages and  that  the resulting  employment  effects 
are small.48  Survey evidence also suggests that individuals  tend to give 
health insurance  a higher value than the cost to employers of actually 
providing  it. 49This  implies  that  workers  would  be willing  to accept lower 
wages in return  for employer  payment  of insurance  premiums  and that 
the change  in employment  at firms  not currently  providing  health  insur- 
ance is likely to be small. 
The nature  of retirement  and labor force participation  among older 
individuals may also change following reform. Many workers "par- 
48. See Gruber  and  Krueger  (1990),  which  examines  the effect of workers'  compensa- 
tion insurance,  and Gruber  (1994),  which looks at the effect of mandated  maternity  ben- 
efits. 
49. The  Employee  Benefit  Research  Institute  (1993)  asked  individuals  how much  extra 
wage compensation  would induce  them  to give up their  employer-provided  health  insur- 
ance. The mean  response  was $4,850. In contrast,  the average  cost to firms  of providing 
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tially" retire, moving from full-time  employment  to part-time  employ- 
ment or self-employment  before leaving the labor force entirely. The 
provision  of subsidies  only to those who are not working  will discourage 
partial  retirement,  changing  not only the timing of retirement  but the 
process by which workers  leave the labor  force as well. 
Finally, to the extent that firms  design their compensation  packages 
to meet certain objectives, changes in retirement behavior brought 
about by health care reform  may induce firms  to restructure  the nature 
of other  retirement  incentives in ways that  may  either  reinforce  or offset 
this behavior. For example, if health care reform  encourages  early re- 
tirement among workers whom the firm would like to continue em- 
ploying, the firm  may change  its pension  plan  in order  to discourage  this 
early retirement. While the possibility of this type of firm response 
makes evaluating  the overall effects of health care reform  on employ- 
ment  difficult,  it serves to point  out the many  ways in which  health  insur- 
ance affects both individual  and  firm  behavior. 
Does  Retiree  Health  Insurance  Explain the Trend toward Early 
Retirement? 
Beyond the issue of the employment  effects of health  care  reform,  the 
results in this paper can also be used to address the question of how 
much  of the persistent  long-run  trend  toward  early  retirement  can be ex- 
plained  by the increased  availability  of postretirement  health  insurance. 
Figure 5 shows the dramatic  decline in the labor  force participation  of 
older men over the past three decades. In 1960,  34 percent  of men over 
age 65 were working;  by 1990,  this fraction  had fallen to 16 percent. In 
absolute  terms, the decline in labor  force participation  among  men aged 
60-64 is equally striking,  falling  from 82 percent  in 1960  to 56 percent  in 
1990. 
Part  of this decline is due to changes in both social security and pri- 
vate pensions. Estimates of the effect of social security on retirement 
vary  widely. Jerry  Hausman  and  David Wise suggest  that  the 20-25 per- 
cent real increase in the value of social security benefits in the 1970s 
could  explain  about  30  percent  of the decline  in labor  force participation; 
Gary  Burtless,  however, estimates  much smaller  effects.S?  More  recent 
50. See Hausman  and  Wise  (1985)  and  Burtless  (1986,  p. 801).  Quinn,  Burkhauser,  and 
Myers  (1990)  review  the literature  on the determinants  of retirement. 220  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1994 
Figure 5.  Labor Force Participation of Men,  1960-91 
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work has turned  to estimating  the effect of pension incentives on retire- 
ment. Andrew  Samwick  finds  that  growth  in the availability  of pensions 
accounts  for 27 percent  of the reduction  in aggregate  labor  force partici- 
pation.51  Together, therefore, pensions and social security explain be- 
tween one-third  and one-half  of the decline in the labor  force participa- 
tion of older individuals. 
As figures  2 and  3 show, the availability  of employer-provided  postre- 
tirement  health  insurance  has also grown  substantially  over this time  pe- 
riod. While about 25 percent of retirees in the 1960s  had retiree health 
insurance,  close to half of retirees in the 1980s  had such coverage. The 
results of this paper suggest that retiree health insurance  is associated 
with early  retirement. 
How much  of the aggregate  decline in labor  force participation  can be 
explained  by the increased  availability  of retiree  health  insurance?  The 
estimates  in table  8 of the effect of retiree  health  insurance  on the proba- 
bility  of early  retirement  can  be used to answer  this question.  The results 
from the NMES data in the first column of table 8 imply that retiree 
health  insurance  increases the probability  of early retirement  by 15  per- 
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centage points; those from the two SIPP samples imply a somewhat 
smaller  effect of about 7 percentage  points. Figures 2 and 3 show that 
retiree  health  insurance  was made available  to an additional  25 percent 
of working  men between 1960  and 1985.  The aggregate  effect of retiree 
health  insurance  would therefore  be a reduction  of 1.75  to 3.75 percent- 
age points in the probability of retirement before age 65 (1.75 = 7 x 0.25, 
3.75 =  15  x 0.25). The overall reduction  in the labor  force participation 
rate  of men aged 55-64 over this same  time period  was about 18  percent- 
age points. This suggests that  the increased  availability  of retiree  health 
insurance  can account for 10-21 percent of the aggregate  reduction  in 
the labor  force participation  of older men over the past three decades. 
This effect is within  the range  of estimates  for social security  discussed 
above and about half of the estimated effect arising  from private pen- 
sions. 
Can Medicare  Eligibility Explain  the  "Excess"  Retirement 
at Age  65? 
Another natural  question to ask is whether  health insurance  can ex- 
plain  the "excess" spike  in the retirement  hazard  at age 65, which exists 
even after accounting  for financial  incentives for retirement.52  To ad- 
dress this question directly, one would ideally like an estimate of how 
retiree health insurance  affects the retirement  hazard  at each age. Al- 
though  the data  used in this paper  do not lend themselves to the estima- 
tion of such a hazard, figure 6 plots the empirical hazard based on 
the actual  retirement  ages for each of the three data sets. I have not re- 
moved the effects of any of the other factors that influence  retirement, 
but figure  6 is nonetheless illustrative  of the differences in the hazard 
rates  for those with and  without  retiree  health  insurance.53 
Note that  the overall shapes of the hazards  are consistent with those 
in the previous  literature  and  exhibit  the characteristic  spikes at ages 62 
and  65 associated  with social security  eligibility.  However, the shape is 
not markedly  different  for those with and without retiree health insur- 
52. Lumsdaine,  Stock, and  Wise (forthcoming). 
53. In particular,  the removal  of cohort effects could alter the hazards  to the extent 
that older cohorts  are both less likely to have retiree  health  insurance  and less likely to 
have  retired  early  for  other  reasons.  The  data,  however,  are  too sparse  to actually  estimate 
a probability  of retirement  at each age that  adequately  controls  for these and  other  effects. 222  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1994 
Figure 6.  Probability of Early Retirement with and without Retiree Health Insurance 
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ance, and, in particular,  the spike at age 65 is not diminished  for those 
with retiree  health  insurance.  In two of the three data sets, the spike at 
age 65 is actually  larger  for those with  retiree  health  insurance.  If entitle- 
ment to Medicare  were a substantial  explanation  of the spike in the re- 
tirement  hazard  at age 65, we would expect that individuals  with retiree Brigitte  C. Madrian  223 
Figure 6  (continued) 
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health  insurance  would not exhibit such a spike or, to the extent that  the 
spike  exists for other  reasons (such  as social security  and  pension  incen- 
tives), it should  be smaller  for those with retiree  health  insurance. 
To the extent that Medicare  is inferior  to employer-provided  health 
insurance, this finding  may not be quite so surprising.  Employer-pro- 
vided health insurance  coverage is typically much more generous than 
Medicare.  In 1989,  only 6 percent of individuals  covered by employer- 
provided  health  insurance  in firms  with 100  workers  or more  had  deduct- 
ibles above $300 a year, while Medicare  enrollees faced deductibles  of 
$560 for hospital stays of less than 60 days in addition  to a $75 annual 
physician  deductible.  While  employer-provided  health  insurance  almost 
always covers prescription  drugs, Medicare does not. And while 70 
percent  of individuals  with employer  health  insurance  have their  out-of- 
pocket expenditures  limited to $1,500 or less, Medicare  has no out-of- 
pocket maximum. Overall, Medicare pays about 45 percent of the 
medical expenditures incurred by those over age 65.  Given these 
54. These figures  on the generosity  of both private  health  insurance  and  Medicare,  as 
well as the fraction  of expenditures  paid by Medicare,  come from Piacentini  and Foley 
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differences  in coverage, individuals  may simply  place a sufficiently  low 
value on Medicare  that it provides no inducement  to give up employer- 
provided  health  insurance  upon  reaching  age 65. 
Medicare  eligibility  may also have little effect on retirement  because 
spouses of those eligible  for Medicare  do not themselves receive cover- 
age until  they turn  65. For those who are married  with family  coverage, 
giving up one's employer-provided  health insurance upon retirement 
also implies  giving  up coverage  for one's spouse. If individuals  delay re- 
tirement  to maintain  their  own health  insurance  coverage, it is also likely 
that they will delay retirement  to maintain  coverage for a spouse. With 
appropriate  data, this is actually  something  one could test: among  those 
with employer-provided  retiree health insurance,  does Medicare  eligi- 
bility  have a greater  effect on retirement  for those who are single  and  for 
those whose spouses have already  reached  age 65? Given  the retrospec- 
tive nature  of the data used in this paper, this comparison  is difficult  to 
make since the spouses of individuals  at the time of retirement  may no 
longer  be in the data, either  because of death  or divorce. 
Conclusion 
As the U.S.  economy moves closer to health care reform, under- 
standing the economic consequences of changing the way in which 
health  care is financed  and  delivered  is important  for guiding  policymak- 
ers as they shape the proposals for change. One area of the economy 
likely to be affected in significant  ways is the labor market.  This paper 
has discussed the various ways in which health insurance  might influ- 
ence both individual  and firm  behavior,  focusing in particular  on its ef- 
fect on retirement. 
I have examined the effect of employer-provided  postretirement 
health insurance on both the age at retirement  and the probability  of 
early  retirement.  Using three  different  data  sets, I found  that  individuals 
with  retiree  health  insurance  retire  much  earlier  than  individuals  without 
such coverage. Estimates of this effect range  from 5 to 16 months, al- 
though  most of the coefficients  point to an effect of about 1 year. I also 
found that retiree health insurance  increases the probability  of retiring 
before age 65 by between 7 and 15  percentage  points. Both of these ef- 
fects are sizable and suggest that individual  retirement  decisions are Brigitte C. Madrian  225 
quite responsive to the availability  of postretirement  health insurance. 
Using these results  to evaluate  the likely effects of health  care reform  on 
the labor  force participation  of older  individuals,  I estimated  that  a move 
to universal  coverage along  the lines set forth  in the Clinton  health  care 
proposal  would reduce the labor  force participation  of men aged 60-64 
by 4.3 percentage  points. 
While this effect is significant,  it is important  to realize that health 
care reform  may affect the labor  market  for older workers  in ways that 
may  either  increase  or decrease  employment.  For example, community- 
rating  of insurance  premiums,  a feature  of many  reform  proposals,  may 
lower the price to firms  of hiring  older workers, thereby increasing  de- 
mand  and partially  offsetting  the decrease in the labor  supply  estimated 
in this paper. Or, firms may change their pension incentives or other 
components  of their compensation  package  in response to the changes 
in individual  behavior  induced  by reform. 
Beyond the issue of retirement,  there are many other aspects of the 
labor  market  likely to be affected by changes in the provision  of health 
insurance.  The overall employment  effects associated with health care 
reform  will be determined  not only by the retirement  decisions of older 
workers  but also by the labor  force participation  decisions of secondary 
earners,  welfare  participants,  and  the unemployed.  In addition  to its em- 
ployment  effects, health  insurance  may also matter  for the structure  of 
the labor market,  influencing  such things as job mobility, self-employ- 
ment, and the demand for full-time versus part-time  workers. While 
there is an emerging  literature  on many of these labor market  effects, 
much  research  remains  to be done before we can fully address  the issue 
of how health  insurance  affects the labor  market. 
APPENDIX 
Data  and Estimation 
THIS PAPER  uses three different  data sets to estimate the effect of em- 
ployer-provided  retiree health insurance  on the age at retirement:  the 
1987  National  Medical  Expenditure  Survey and two supplements  to the 
Survey of Income and Program  Participation.  All three data sources 
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Table Al.  Descriptive Statistics of Data 
Units as indicated 
Survey  of Inicome Sur-vey  of Income 
National Medical  and Program  and Program 
Expenditure  Participation  Participation 
Survey  (EWH)  (CJR) 
Standar  d  Standard  Standard 
Variable  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation 
Age  71.4  6.02  70.6  6.45  70.3  6.35 
Age at retirement  63.1  4.05  63.6  4.69  62.6  3.82 
Black (percent)  9.9  30.00  7.8  26.70  3.4  24.40 
Education  (years)  11.0  3.41  10.2  3.70  11.1  3.49 
Retiree  health  insurance  (percent)  46.0  49.90  39.7  48.90  63.8  48.10 
Pension  (percent)  ...  ...  57.0  49.50  100.0  0.00 
Industry  (percent) 
Agriculture  and constructiona  14.5  35.2  ...  ...  10.3  30.4 
Manufacturing  and transportationb  46.7  49.9  ...  ...  55.6  49.7 
Sales  12.5  33.1  ...  ...  7.3  26.0 
Financial  and professionalc  14.3  34.9  ...  ...  11.7  32.2 
Public  administration  6.5  25.1  ...  ...  15.1  35.8 
Unknown  5.3  22.5  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Occupation  (percent) 
Professional  and technicald  25.1  43.4  ...  ...  27.3  44.6 
Sales and clerical  14.3  35.0  ...  ...  13.3  33.9 
Craftsmen  and operatorse  45.9  49.8  ...  ...  49.5  50.0 
Service  7.1  25.7  ...  ...  9.4  29.2 
Farm  managers  and laborers  4.1  19.8  ...  ...  0.5  6.9 
Unknown  3.5  18.3  ...  ...  ... 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based on data from the  1987 NMES  and two supplements  to the SIPP. See  text for 
details. 
a.  Also  includes  forestry  and fishing. 
b.  Also  includes  communications,  utilities,  and repair services. 
c.  Also  includes  insurance,  real estate,  and personal  services. 
d.  Also  includes  managerial and administrative  workers. 
e.  Also  includes  transportation workers  and laborers. 
ance as well as the age at retirement.  The data sets are described  briefly 
in the text, and  descriptive  statistics are presented  in table Al. 
Estimation 
Two types of retirement  equations are estimated in the paper. The 
first  is a basic ordinary  least squares  specification  of the form 
(A-1)  yi =  i'xi  +  yRHI, +  Ei,  EiN(0,u2), 
where y, is age at retirement,  xi is a vector of demographic  characteris- 
tics, and  RHIi is a dummy  variable  equal to one if the individual  has re- Brigitte C. Madrian  227 
Figure Al.  Truncation of the Retirement Age Distribution 
Observations 
Retirement  age 
not  observed 
Truncated True  Point of 
mean  mean  truncation 
Age at retirement 
tiree health  insurance.  As mentioned  in the text, one problem  with esti- 
mating  this ordinary  least squares  specification  is that  in the data  an indi- 
vidual's retirement  age is observed only if that individual  has retired 
(that  is, one observes a conditional retirement  age, yi I  yi <  age,); retire- 
ment age is missing  for all individuals  who retire  at an age greater  than 
their  current  age. This is illustrated  in figure  Al. Those individuals  in the 
shaded  area  of the distribution  who have not yet retired  will be excluded 
from  the estimation  because their  retirement  age is not yet known. As a 
result,  the average  retirement  age measured  in the sample  of those actu- 
ally retired  (the truncated  mean)  will be less than  the true  population  av- 
erage  observed if one knew the retirement  age of everyone. 
If retiree  health  insurance  does indeed  decrease  the average  age at re- 
tirement, this truncation  will yield an estimate of the effect of retiree 
health  insurance  that  is too small  in an ordinary  least squares  regression. 
This is illustrated  in figure  A2. Because the retirement  age distribution 
for those with retiree health insurance  lies to the left of that for those 
without  retiree  health  insurance,  the sample  truncation  will be more se- 
vere among  those without retiree health insurance.  The difference  be- 228  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
Figure A2.  Measuring the Effect of Retiree Health Insurance with Truncation 
Observations 
Withi  retir-ee  '  Without  retiree 
health insuran  ce  i  ihealth  insur-ance 
t1 m1  t2  m2  Point of 
truncation 
Age at retirement 
tween the true mean and the truncated  mean retirement  age will there- 
fore be greater  for those without  retiree  health  insurance.  While  the true 
measure  of y is given by ml -  m2 (the difference  between the true  mean 
retirement  ages of those with and without  retiree  health  insurance),  the 
estimate obtained  from an ordinary  least squares regression  will equal 
tl  -  t2, the (smaller)  difference  between the truncated  means. 
The estimate  of interest, however, is the effect of retiree  health  insur- 
ance on age at retirement  in the population  as a whole (mi  -  M2), not 
just among  those actually  retired  (t, -  t2). This estimate  can be obtained 
by noting  that the probability  of an individual  retiring  at a particular  age 
is given by the probability  of retiring  at that age conditional  on retire- 
ment  being  observed, multiplied  by the probability  that  the person  is re- 
tired: 
(A-2)  P (yi =  Y) =  P(yi  =  Yl yi < agei)  x  P (yi < agei). 
Based on this formula, I estimate the unconditional  effect of retiree 
health  insurance  on retirement  using the truncated  data in two different 
ways. 
The first  is to restrict  the sample  to those over age 70, an age at which Brigitte  C. Madrian  229 
85 percent  of individuals  report  being  retired.  With  this restriction  on the 
sample, the probability  that an individual  is retired  P (yi < agei) is close 
to one and the conditional  effect estimated  using ordinary  least squares 
will not deviate too far from the unconditional  effect. This procedure  is 
somewhat unsatisfactory  because it ignores all of the information  on 
how retiree  health  insurance  affects the retirement  of younger  cohorts. 
I therefore  also estimate  a standard  truncated  regression  model that  ex- 
plicitly accounts for the truncation  and can make use of the full sample 
of retired  individuals.55  Note that  if one is willing  to make  an assumption 
about  the underlying  distribution  of the age at retirement,  the part  of the 
distribution  that  is observed can be used to infer  the shape of the rest of 
the distribution.  If the errors in equation  A-I are distributed  normally 
with mean zero and variance  U2, then the probability  that an individual 
retires  at a particular  age P(y1 =  Y) in equation  A-2 is simply (1/U)44[(y 
-  i'Xi  -  yRHIi)/o], while the probabilility of being retired and observed 
in the data, P(y1  <  age,), equals  1 [(agei-  r'xi  -  yRHIi)/o], where 4 is a 
normal  density function  and 1 is a cumulative  normal  distribution  func- 
tion. The conditional  density  function  of the age at retirement  given that 
an individual  is actually retired,  P(y%  I  yi <  agei), is now that of a trun- 
cated normal: 
(A-3)  f(yi I  y. I age1) =  (l/1u)4[(y 
-  3' xi - 
yRHI)/cr]  (A-3)  f(y.  I~~(  [(age1 -  P'i-  yRHIi)/u] 
which can be directly  estimated.  The corresponding  log-likelihood  func- 
tion is given by 
(A-4) log L =  -N  log [(2h)12 (X]  -  ( 
' X-  YRHIi) = 
-  >  log b  (agei 
-  xi -  YRHI1) 
Note that  the variance  parameter,  U2, is estimated  along  with a and y. 
55. See Hausman  and Wise (1977)  and Maddala  (1983).  Note that  it is not possible  to 
estimate  the more  commonly  used censored-regression  model  in this context  because,  for 
individuals  who have  not  retired,  the values  of both  the left-  and  some  right-hand-side  vari- 
ables  are missing;  not only does one not observe  a retirement  age for those not yet retired 
but  one also cannot  infer  whether  these individuals  have  retiree  health  insurance  until  they 
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Definition of Retirement 
As mentioned  in the text, several different  definitions  of retirement 
have been used in the empirical  literature  on retirement,  including  (1) a 
"permanent"  departure  from  the labor  force, (2) a substantial  reduction 
in the usual number  of hours worked, (3) self-reported  retirement,  and 
(4) receipt  of pension or social security  benefits.  Although  the definition 
of retirement  that  could be examined  in this paper  was limited  by the in- 
formation  available  in the three data sets, alternative  definitions  to the 
ones used to derive the empirical  results  presented  in the paper  are pos- 
sible. 
In the NMES, I have information  on the date of retirement  for those 
who report  ever having  retired-a  self-reported  definition  of retirement. 
In addition,  I also know whether  an individual  is currently  working-if 
so, I know how many  hours;  if not, I know whether  the stated  reason  for 
not working  is retirement.  This makes  it possible to consider  alternative 
(stricter)  definitions  of retirement,  such as reported  having  retired  and 
not currently working. In the estimation, implementing  this stricter 
definition  amounts  to truncating  individuals  who are currently  working 
even if they report  a retirement  date. Table 5 uses having ever retired 
and not currently  working  as the definition  of retirement  in the NMES. 
The SIPP-CJR  sample  is confined  to those who are receiving  pension 
income, and the primary  definition  of retirement  is the date at which an 
individual  left the  job from  which he is receiving  pension benefits. I can 
also further  restrict  the sample  to those not currently  in the labor  force 
or who work  fewer than  a specified  number  of hours  a week. To be con- 
sistent with the definition  used in the NMES, retirement  in table  7 is de- 
fined  as having  retired  from  ajob and not currently  working. 
In the SIPP-EWH  sample, which comprises  individuals  who did not 
work at all in the previous quarter,  retirement  corresponds  to the date 
last worked. Some of these individuals,  however, may be not working 
for reasons other than retirement,  so I can also consider an alternative 
definition  of retirement,  which is not working  and not in the labor  force. 
This topical  module  included  a question  about  the reason  for leaving  the 
last  job, so the sample  can be further  confined  to those individuals  who 
report  retirement  as the reason  for having  left. Table  6 uses not working 
and  being  out of the labor  force as the definition  of retirement. 
Table  A2 compares  the regression  coefficients  on retiree  health  insur- Brigitte  C. Madrian  231 
Table A2.  Explaining Retiree Health Insurance Using Alternative Definitions 
of Retirementa 
Retiree  health 
Definition  of retirement  insurance  coefficient 
National  Medical  Expenditure Survey 
Ever  retired  -  1.388 
(0.208) 
Ever retired and not  -  1.400 
working  (0.217) 
Ever retired, not working  -  1.462 
because  retired  (0.227) 
Survey of Income  and Program 
Participation  (EWH) 
Not  working  -  0.650 
(0.275) 
Not  working and  -  0.627 
not in labor force  (0.275) 
Not  working because  retired  -  0.899 
(0.283) 
Survey of Income  and Program 
Participation  (CJR) 
Ever retired  -  0.669 
(0.177) 
Ever retired and not working  -  0.723 
(0.193) 
Ever retired and working fewer  -0.652 
than 20 hours a week  (0.187) 
Source:  Author's  regressions  based on data from the  1987 NMES  and two  supplements  to the SIPP. 
a.  The table presents  coefficients  from a truncated regression  model in which the dependent  variable is the age at 
retirement.  The  sample  consists  of  men aged 55-84.  All specifications  include  education,  race,  and a complete  set 
of cohort dummies.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
ance using three different  definitions  of retirement  for each of the three 
data  sets. (These  coefficients  are  derived  from  a truncated  regression  us- 
ing the full sample  of individuals  aged 55-84.) As can be seen, the coef- 
ficients  do not change significantly  in any of the data sets in response to 
a different  definition  of retirement. 
Definition of Retiree  Health  Insurance 
In the NMES, retiree health insurance is defined from a question 
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whether  they received retiree  health  insurance  from  the  job from  which 
they had  retired.  In both  of the SIPP  data  sets, coverage  by retiree  health 
insurance  is derived  from  a series of questions  about  whether  an individ- 
ual is covered by any private health insurance, whether this policy is 
held in the individual's  own name, and whether  it comes from a current 
or former  employer.  For individuals  who are retired,  it is likely that  any 
employer-provided  health insurance  actually held by that individual  is 
retiree  health insurance,  and this is therefore  how retiree health insur- 
ance is defined. The NMES also includes a similar  series of questions, 
which makes  it possible to compare  the definition  of retiree  health  insur- 
ance used in the NMES with that used in the SIPP. The matrix  below 
shows the percent  of individuals  reporting  both types of coverage in the 
NMES_ 
With  Without 
employer-  employer- 
provided  provided 
insurance  insurance 
With insurance  37.7  7.4 
Without insurance  3.9  51.0 
As one might expect, there are some discrepancies in the two defini- 
tions; however, the vast majority of individuals give consistent re- 
sponses to both sets of questions.  The empirical  results  in the NMES are 
not sensitive to the definition  of retiree  health  insurance  that  is chosen. Comments 
and Discussion 
Gary Burtless: The central  issue treated  in this paper  is the effect of re- 
tiree health  benefits  on the labor  force participation  of older men. Does 
the availability  of employer-sponsored  retirement  health insurance  re- 
duce the probability  that older men will remain  in the labor  force? 
I know little about the economics of health insurance, but I have 
given some thought to the issue of retirement. Some historical  back- 
ground  might  be helpful.  The labor  force participation  rate  of older  men 
has been declining  for much of the past century. According to others' 
estimates  and my own tabulations  from  the Current  Population  Survey, 
the participation  rate of men aged 60 and older fell from 67 percent in 
1910  to 55 percent in 1940.1 It then fell to 40 percent in 1970  and to 28 
percent  in 1989. 
The fall in male participation  rates came to a halt in the middle  of the 
1980s,  but  then  it resumed  in the past recession. I would  guess, however, 
that the trend  toward  earlier  retirement  slowed very noticeably  around 
1983  or 1984.  Several specialists on male labor  supply-including Rich- 
ard Burkhauser,  Robert Moffitt, and myself-have  suggested that the 
trend  toward  earlier  retirement  may  even reverse  over the medium  term. 
Many  people believe the drop  in participation  rates can be explained 
by such factors as generous social security  benefits, liberal  private  pen- 
sions, the introduction  of Medicare, or employer-provided  retirement 
health  insurance.  Some or all of these factors certainly  played a role. 
It seems doubtful  that these factors can provide a complete  explana- 
tion for the drop  in participation  rates. Labor  force participation  had  al- 
ready  fallen by a significant  amount  before any of these developments 
became important.  For example, participation  among  older men fell 12 
percentage  points in the three decades after 1910,  even though  the first 
1. Ransom,  Sutch,  and  Williamson  (1991,  p. 29). 
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social security  check was not mailed  out until 1940.  Another  explanation 
for the fall in participation  rates might  be that the taste for leisure in old 
age has grown.  Alternatively,  rising  lifetime  wages and  increased  wealth 
may provide older Americans with the resources to indulge their un- 
changed  tastes for retirement. 
Brigitte  Madrian  wants to know how large  a role retiree  health  insur- 
ance has played in the trend toward earlier retirement.  More intrigu- 
ingly, she asks whether  health  insurance  reform  could have a sizable or 
even a predictable  effect on future  male  participation  rates. I should  say 
right  off that I am a fan of this kind  of exercise, and I think  Madrian  has 
done a very good  job in carrying  it out. 
My comments will be divided into two parts. First, I consider Ma- 
drian's  empirical  estimates in comparison  with those that would be ob- 
tained  from  an ideal  data  set. This is not meant  as a criticism  of her  work, 
but  as a guide  to thinking  about  the reliability  of the estimates  of the coef- 
ficient  she is attempting  to measure.  In the second part  of my comments, 
I consider  whether  this coefficient,  even if it is reliably  estimated,  can be 
used for practical  policy analysis. Has Madrian  estimated the number 
one needs to know to predict  the consequences of health insurance  re- 
form  on labor  force participation? 
Empirical Estimation 
Madrian's  paper surveys some past evidence on the subject of em- 
ployer-provided  health  insurance  and develops a great  deal of new evi- 
dence. Though she is respectful  of the earlier  literature,  she points out 
its serious shortcomings. 
The main shortcoming-one  that afflicts her own analysis as well- 
is the weakness of the data available  to researchers.  I was impressed  in 
reading  her literature  survey by the ingenuity  of earlier  researchers  in 
overcoming this limitation. It is equally impressive that Madrian  has 
been able to find  not one, not two, but three  new data sets with which to 
analyze the issue. But these new data sets, like the earlier  ones, suffer 
from serious  deficiencies. 
Madrian  suggests  that  an ideal  data set would contain  longitudinal  in- 
formation  on men  who had  not retired  at the time of the initial  survey  but 
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would elicit information  on the availability  and quality of employer- 
sponsored  health  insurance,  before  and  after  a worker's  hypothetical  re- 
tirement.  In addition,  the surveys would ask questions  about  other  pos- 
sible determinants  of retirement-pension accruals,  social security  enti- 
tlement, health  status, and wages, as well as similar  information  on the 
worker's spouse. 
I think we can improve on this wish list. Let's be ambitious, and 
dream  the impossible  dream. An ideal data set would not only include 
the information  Madrian  mentions  but would be collected from a group 
of workers  who have been assigned  to a retirement  health  plan  (or to no 
plan at all) by the flip of a coin. In other words, the information  would 
be derived  from a classical experiment  in which the randomly  assigned 
treatment  is the retirement  health plan available to each worker. Be- 
cause plan assignment is random, it would be uncorrelated  with the 
worker's wage, health status, private  pension plan, and social security 
entitlement. 
Before dismissing  this dream  data set out of hand, remember  that in 
the late 1970s  and  early 1980s  the Rand  Health  Insurance  Study  actually 
managed  to assign insurance  plans on a random  basis to a few thousand 
working  families.  Ethical  considerations  prevented  Rand  from  assigning 
families  to no health  plan  at all, so the data  have little  value  for answering 
Madrian's  question. But we could still use the Rolls-Royce standard  of 
classical experiments  as a benchmark  for considering  the data sets Ma- 
drian  is actually  forced to use. 
The ideal data  set would  be longitudinal,  and it would cover the labor 
market  experience of a cohort  from the time its retirement  planning  be- 
gins-say,  age 50 or 55-until  an age when most retirements  have oc- 
curred-say,  age 68 or 70. This would  ensure  good contemporaneous  in- 
formation  on each worker's labor force or retirement status and the 
factors affecting  labor  force decisions around  the age of retirement. 
Instead, Madrian  is forced to rely on what are essentially cross- 
sectional surveys of retirees, some of whom have retired  10  or 15  years 
before the date of the interview. She must depend on respondents'  un- 
certain  memories  to reconstruct  the timing  of retirement.  Even worse, 
she must infer the health insurance  constraints  facing a worker at the 
time of his retirement  on the basis of his actual insurance  coverage at 
the time of the interview.  Needless to say, a number  of things  may have 
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view. One thing  that may have changed  is the health  insurance  arrange- 
ments of the retired  worker. 
The perfect data set would contain information  about social security 
and  pension  accruals  covering  the period  before retirement  occurs. The 
data sets used here contain  information  on retirees'  actual social secur- 
ity or pension payment  at the time of the interview. If the respondent  is 
under  age 62, I presume  his social security  entitlement  is unknown-no 
actual payment is observed. If he is over age 62, his private pension 
under  a defined  benefit  plan  that  is coordinated  with  social security  (such 
as the United Auto Workers'  plan for Big Three auto workers)  may be 
considerably  lower than the pension he received right  after retirement, 
assuming he retired before age 62. Under the auto workers' pension 
plan, for example, the monthly  pension falls when retirees  reach  age 62 
and can begin to claim social security  benefits. 
A good data  set would  include  information  about  respondents'  health 
around  the time of retirement-ideally, at least a year or two before it 
occurs. Every reliable  retirement  study known to me shows that health 
status is one of the most, if not the most, important  determinants  of re- 
tirement. All of Madrian's  data sets have good information  about re- 
spondents' health status-at  the time of the interview. By definition, 
this interview  occurred  some time after retirement.  Sensibly, Madrian 
does not use the health  status  data  in her analysis. 
The ideal data set would include information  about respondents' 
hourly  wage or potential  annual  earnings  around  the time he is consider- 
ing whether  to retire. The whole edifice of economic theory explaining 
when workers retire rests on the assumption  that rational  agents care- 
fully weigh the attractiveness  of retirement  leisure  against  the price that 
must be paid in forgone earnings. Madrian  lacks reliable information 
about  wages or potential  earnings. 
Finally, the ideal data set would contain  information  about men who 
had been assigned to their retirement  health plan on the basis of a ran- 
dom draw. Madrian  does not have this kind of data. Instead, she is 
forced to use naturally  occuring  information.  In the real  world, workers 
are much more likely to be covered by retirement  health insurance  if 
they are also covered by a retirement  pension plan;  they are much less 
likely to be offered  retiree  health  benefits  if they lack pension coverage. 
It is clear from table 9 that men in the most generous pension plans 
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men in less generous  plans. The strong  correlation  between the generos- 
ity of  employee pensions and the availability of  retirement health 
plans-and  the absence of reliable  information  about  the characteristics 
of pension plans-makes  it difficult  to distinguish  statistically  between 
the separate  contribution  of retiree health plans and generous pension 
plans. By definition,  a controlled random  experiment  would eliminate 
the correlation  between retiree health plans and other features of the 
compensation  package,  such  as the pension  plan,  that  also affect  the tim- 
ing of retirement. 
Random  assignment of retirement  health plans also gets around a 
more troublesome-and  more subtle-statistical  problem. It is likely 
that  workers  select their  employers,  to some extent, based on the gener- 
osity of different  components of the compensation  package. Workers 
who prefer to retire in their 50s should seek out employers who offer 
pension  and health  plans that make  early retirement  affordable  and  fea- 
sible. People who do not mind  working  into their  late 60s should  accept 
jobs that, other  things  equal, offer  less deferred  compensation  and  more 
current  money wages. 
Madrian  seems to suggest  that this is a fairly  minor  consideration  be- 
cause most workers retire from  jobs they took 20 or 30 years earlier, 
when retirement  considerations  were low on their  list of priorities.  I do 
not entirely  agree. I live near  Washington,  D.C., so many  of my friends 
and neighbors  are civil servants. Many of them speak with fondness of 
attaining  their  55th  birthdays,  when they will be free to retire.  They also 
speak with great authority  about the exact pension and health  benefits 
that  will be forthcoming  when they reach  age 55. 
Many  workers  are crudely  aware  of whether  particular  employers  of- 
fer some kind of retirement  benefit package. This is not exactly rocket 
science. Even 30-year-old  workers realize that public employers, auto 
companies,  and  large  paternalistic  firms  are excellent places to find  jobs 
if one wishes to stop working  before one is too old to enjoy the winter 
in Orlando  or Sun City. If just 10 workers out of every 100  act on this 
knowledge,  we could observe a large  and statistically  significant  gap  be- 
tween the average  retirement  age of workers  in companies  with gener- 
ous retirement  plans  and those who work  for companies  with  less gener- 
ous provision  of retirement  benefits. 
If workers  were randomly  assigned  to their  retiree  health  plans when 
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would  be avoided. Madrian  cannot  avoid the problem  with the data sets 
she uses here. Any systematic difference between the preferences of 
workers  in different  kinds  of companies  would show up in her estimates 
as an "effect"  of retiree  health  plans  on early retirement. 
Let me repeat  that  none of these remarks  represents  a criticism  of the 
analysis Madrian  has performed  here. She has been dealt a bad hand, 
and she has played it extremely well. But the shortcomings  of her data 
should make readers wary in interpreting  the coefficients she has ob- 
tained. My view is that, along with the earlier  findings  described  in her 
survey, her new estimates suggest  that  retirement  health  plans  probably 
encourage  workers  to retire  somewhat  earlier  than  they would  if offered 
a compensation  package  that lacked retirement  health benefits. On the 
other  hand,  I would  be surprised  if a classical experiment  of the type de- 
scribed  would  show that  the effect of retirement  health  plans  is to reduce 
male retirement  ages by as much as a year, which is the estimate that 
Madrian  seems to prefer. 
This skepticism  is based on my best guesses about  the size and direc- 
tion of the biases that  affect the empirical  estimates. For example, I can 
easily believe that  employee self-selection  might  account  for half  the re- 
tirement  difference  between  workers  covered by retirement  health  plans 
and workers  who are not covered. 
In addition, my reading  of the retirement  literature  is a bit different 
from  Madrian's.  Contrary  to her interpretation  that  there  is a wide range 
of estimates of the effect of social security  on retirement,  my reading  is 
that the range of credible estimates is quite narrow.  All of the reliable 
studies of this question-and  there are many  of them-find  statistically 
significant  but quantitatively  small effects of social security benefit in- 
creases on retirement.  The two studies she mentions-one  by Hausman 
and Wise and the other  by me-find  very similar  responses to the 1969- 
73 benefit  liberalization,  even though  we used very different  methods  to 
analyze  the episode.2  If this major  liberalization  in benefits  had  an effect 
as small  as analysts  believe, how likely is it that  employer-sponsored  re- 
tirement  health insurance  could have an effect as large as the one that 
Madrian  finds?  To find  out, she might  translate  the social security  benefit 
increase into a change in lifetime wealth and then calculate the change 
in lifetime wealth associated with most retiree health plans. Assuming 
the effect of a change in lifetime wealth on retirement is the same, 
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whether  caused by a social security benefit  increase or by a retirement 
health plan, can she use estimates from the social security and retire- 
ment  literature  to make  a guesstimate  of the impact  of retirement  health 
plans on retirement?  I suspect the implied  effect would be smaller  than 
the one Madrian  reports  in this paper. 
Policy  Applications 
Even assuming  that Madrian  has obtained  a robust estimator  of the 
effect of retirement  health plans on age at retirement,  can one use her 
estimate to predict the consequences of health insurance  reform?  Re- 
member  that the coefficient  that  would be produced  by the ideal experi- 
ment  would  measure  the effect on a representative  sample  of men of the 
effect of providing (or withholding)  retirement  health insurance as a 
component  of employee compensation. 
I see a couple of problems  with the policy analysis that is attempted 
in this paper. The financing and personnel policy implications of a 
change in retiree health benefits make the population work response 
very uncertain.  If retiree  health  insurance  is added  to employee  compen- 
sation, how do employers pay for it? What other components of the 
compensation  package  might  change?  There  is an implicit  assumption- 
not in this paper  but in much of the policy discussion-that  employees 
are  offered  a free lunch:  retirement  health  benefits  are  added  to the com- 
pensation  package;  nothing  else about  the package  changes. 
This  cannot  be right.  If employers  have offered  retirement  health  ben- 
efits as a way to attract  or retain  a certain  class of highly  desired work- 
ers, health insurance reform will leave them with the problem of at- 
tracting or retaining these same kinds of employees when all other 
employers offer similar  or identical retiree health benefits. Perhaps it 
would  be sensible  to modify  some other  component  of the compensation 
package-say,  employee pension  accruals-to  accomplish  the same re- 
cruitment  and retention  goals that were formerly  accomplished  by the 
firm's retirement  health plan? If this is true, then health insurance  re- 
form will not have the pure supply-side effect predicted in table 11. 
There will be a demand-side  response of employers: Some will change 
other elements of their compensation  package  to achieve the goals for- 
merly  achieved  by their  retiree  health  insurance. 
Of course, most employers  do not offer retiree  health  benefits. Many 
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involve requiring  all employers to offer and partially  to finance health 
benefits, at least for their current workers. Reform may also involve 
guaranteed  access to subsidized  insurance  for retired  workers  under  age 
65. Depending  on the plan that is finally adopted, reform  will involve 
cross-subsidies  from some kinds of employers  to others and from some 
classes of workers  to others. The cross-subsidies  in President  Clinton's 
current  plan  flow mainly  from  young  workers  to the old and  from  general 
taxpayers  to employers  that now offer generous  retiree  health  benefits. 
The increased subsidies that will be received by older workers  will, 
on the one hand,  make  early  retirement  more  feasible  for these workers. 
The new subsidies  will reduce  the consumption  losses workers  currently 
suffer  as a result  of retirement:  workers  will retain  access to subsidized 
health  insurance  even after  they leave their  career  jobs. 
On the other hand, for most employers,  the subsidies  will reduce the 
cost of employing  older  workers.  Workers  who are age 50 and older  will 
be cheaper, hence more attractive  to hire. Firms  may adjust  by offering 
higher  wages or liberalizing  other  fringe  benefits  in order  to retain  their 
older workers. They may reduce discrimination  against  older  job appli- 
cants in their hiring. From the point of view of older workers, these 
changes will raise the attractions  of remaining  on the payroll  or reduce 
the impediments  to becoming  reemployed  after  a layoff. 
A small-scale  classical experiment,  like the one I described earlier, 
would  not cause employers  to modify  their  compensation  package.  As a 
result, the experiment  would put analysts in a position to observe the 
pure supply-side  response  of workers  to the availability  of retiree  health 
benefits. But analysts would not be in a position to observe the full con- 
sequences of the benefits, because the reaction  of employers would be 
missed. 
The cross-subsidies  proposed  by President  Clinton  will raise the life- 
time wealth of older workers. On balance, I expect that that rise in 
wealth  would  reduce  their  retirement  age. But part  of the increase  in life- 
time wealth  may take the form  of higher  wages or compensation,  which 
would  tend  to keep older  workers  on theirjobs  longer.  This  partly  offsets 
the effects of greater  lifetime  wealth. It is hard  to believe that  Madrian's 
simulation  estimates, shown in table 11, capture the full response of 
older workers  to health  insurance  reform,  once we take account of the 
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Jonathan Gruber: As health care reform  careens forward, the cry of 
"jobs,  jobs, jobs" is once again in the air. Much of the opposition to 
employer  mandates  is based on the contention  that this net new cost to 
employers  will lead to reductions  in labor demand  and subsequent  lay- 
offs. Yet, most analyses of the labor  market  effects of health  care reform 
project  fairly small  job losses, even potential  job gains.  ' In fact, there 
is a much more important  supply-side  labor market  effect that has not 
featured prominently  in this debate: the role of health insurance-in- 
duced immobilities,  or "job  lock." While  this was an important  motiva- 
tion for reform,  there has been little rigorous  analysis of the phenome- 
non. Given the potential  relative  magnitude  of the demand-  and supply- 
side effects of reform,  this represents  a key misallocation  of research  re- 
sources. Brigitte  Madrian's  paper  is an important  first  step toward  reme- 
dying  this misallocation. 
"Job  lock" comes in at least four varieties: reduced mobility  across 
jobs, reduced mobility  off of the welfare rolls and into the labor  force, 
reduced mobility of prime-age  workers from jobs to out of the labor 
force, and reduced  mobility  from work to retirement.  Recent analysis, 
some of it by Madrian  herself, has focused on the first  two of these phe- 
nomena.  She turns  her attention  in this paper  to the last, which might  be 
labeled  "retirement  lock." It is interesting  to note that  little  attention  has 
been paid  to the third  of these effects, which  may  arise  from  health  insur- 
ance "locking"  secondary  earners  into  theirjobs  when they would  prefer 
to be at home. The "voluntary"  reduction  in the prime-age  labor  force, 
resulting  from  loosening  this form  ofjob lock, could be much  larger  than 
the "involuntary"  reduction  from  an employer  mandate. 
Nevertheless, there  are a number  of reasons  to believe that  the retire- 
ment effect is the largest of these distortions, as Madrian  is careful to 
note in her paper. Not only is the average  level of medical costs much 
higher  for the potential  male retiree  than  for the younger  worker,  but  the 
variance  is much higher  as well; one standard  deviation  of medical ex- 
penditures  for people aged 55-64 represents  approximately  30 percent 
of their average income. Thus, for a worker with insurance  on the job 
but without  retiree  coverage, early retirement  could be associated with 
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both a decrease in the level and a substantial  increase  in the variance  of 
consumption.  A large  body of literature  has documented  that  health  sta- 
tus is an important  determinant  of retirement,  yet, until recently, there 
was no study of the effect of health insurance. Madrian's  is the most 
comprehensive  of the recent wave of studies to do So.2 
The methodology  employed  here is to examine  a sample  of retired  in- 
dividuals  and to use information  on their age at retirement,  as well as 
their  current  coverage  by retiree  health  insurance,  to model the effect of 
such coverage on retirement  ages. Madrian  finds  fairly sizable and sig- 
nificant  effects of retiree  insurance  in three  different  data  sets: coverage 
is associated with a reduction  in the retirement  age of 5 to 16 months. 
This is an impressive undertaking,  which is careful in its analysis and 
broad in its scope. The author  deserves special notice for being brave 
enough  to take her analysis to three distinct data sets. And she is rigor- 
ous throughout  the body of the text and the appendix  in exploring  the 
sensitivity  of her findings  to variations  in the specification. 
An important  statistical issue, which the author readily acknowl- 
edges in the text, arises from the fact that the sample  is selected based 
on having retired. This potentially  biases the results downward, since 
individuals  will not be in the sample  if they have not yet retired  because 
of a lack of retiree  coverage, understating  the disincentive  effects of not 
having coverage. The author deals with this problem in two sensible 
ways: by using a truncated  normal  estimator  and by simply cutting  off 
the age distribution  below age 65 or 70, by which  time  most of the sample 
has retired.  Unfortunately,  these approaches  often yield quite different 
estimated  effects. 
Each approach  has a shortcoming,  but I lean toward the cutting off 
the distribution.  The truncated  normal  estimator,  under  certain  assump- 
tions, does account for this selection problem. But, by including  those 
who are younger  than age 65, Madrian  still does not account for an im- 
portant feature of the retiree insurance landscape: the availability  of 
continuation  coverage. In a number  of states before October 1986,  and 
in all states afterward,  workers  who left theirjobs could continue  to buy 
group  insurance  from  their  employers, at the average  group  rate, for up 
to 18 months  after leaving. This provides a substantial  subsidy to early 
retirees, as continuation  coverage is generally  much cheaper than age- 
2. The others being Gruber  and Madrian  (1993a, 1993b);  Gustman  and Steinmeier 
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rated  individual  insurance,  and as a result approximately  two-thirds  of 
eligible retirees take up such coverage.3  Unfortunately,  Madrian  is un- 
able to infer whether  the insurance  coverage that she observes is from 
continuation  benefits  or retiree  health  insurance.4  If these two different 
types of coverage have differential  effects on retirement,  then it is im- 
portant to separate them. But this is difficult to do in the under-65 
sample. 
Truncation  of the sample  at age 65 controls  for continuation  benefits, 
since such coverage is not available to those on Medicare. However, 
this introduces  a different  bias, arising  from  the different  mortality  pros- 
pects of those still alive after age 65. If, among  the set of early retirees, 
those with retiree health insurance  were likely to live longer, then the 
post-65 sample  will overstate the influence  of retiree  coverage. The au- 
thor notes that this could arise if retiree  health insurance  improves  the 
health  of early retirees, but she claims that the resulting  bias is likely to 
be small;  this contention  is supported  by the lack of convincing  evidence 
that health  insurance  coverage actually  matters  for adult  health.5 
However, even if insurance  does not matter  for health, the bias will 
still be present  if those who select to work  in firms  that  offer retiree  cov- 
erage  are  healthier  than  those who do not. For  example, if sicker  individ- 
uals work  at firms  with retiree  coverage, retire  early, and  die before age 
65, then there will be a bias against  her findings.  Madrian  cannot exam- 
ine health  differences  between those who do and do not have coverage, 
since among those already retired  the coverage itself may be affecting 
health.  But it may  be instructive  for  future  analysis  to examine  the health 
of workers  at firms  that do and do not offer retiree  coverage. If it does 
not significantly  differ, then I would prefer the second method of con- 
trolling  for selection. 
There are three major  issues that I would like to raise regarding  the 
basic findings.  First, this paper  has clearly established  a strong  correla- 
tion between retiree coverage and retirement  ages; this is documented 
most strikingly  in figure 1. But is this relationship  causal? There are at 
least two alternative explanations. The first, and probably less  im- 
portant, is selection by workers with a propensity to retire early into 
3. Gruber  and  Madrian  (1993a). 
4. She has  an  explicit  question  about  retiree  coverage  in only  one of her  three  data  sets, 
and even for that question  the respondents  may have confused retiree  and continuation 
coverage. 
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firms  that offer retiree health insurance.  The author  addresses this po- 
tential  problem  by noting  that most of the workers  who retire  have very 
long tenures  and  therefore  are not likely to select a firm  based on retiree 
coverage. But even if the average  retiring  worker  has a long tenure, so 
long as the marginal retiring  worker  is selecting the firm  it will lead to a 
bias of the type described  above. This is especially true if there are peer 
effects in retirement,  whereby one (short-tenure)  worker's retirement 
decision affects the decision of other (long-tenure)  workers  in the same 
workplace. 
One way to assess the importance  of this selection problem  follows 
the long-standing  presumption  in many empirical  articles that "unob- 
servables go the same way as observables."  This philosophy suggests 
that the author's  contention  that selection is unimportant  could be but- 
tressed by examining  the distribution  of characteristics  at firms  that do 
and do not offer coverage. That is, if one were to predict  the propensity 
to retire based on observable characteristics  aside from retiree cover- 
age, would  that  predicted  value be higher  in firms  with retiree  coverage? 
If so, worker  selection may be important. 
The more  important  potential  problem  for the analysis is the fact that 
other omitted  characteristics  offirms may be correlated  with the provi- 
sion of retiree coverage. The most obvious of these potential omitted 
variables  is pension generosity. The author  addresses this point as well 
as possible given the data limitations,  running  the regressions  with in- 
dustry and occupation  controls, as well as only among  those with pen- 
sions. But the fact, admirably  highlighted  by the paper,  that the average 
pension  benefit  of workers  who have retiree  insurance  is higher  than  that 
of workers without such insurance  does suggest further  differences in 
pension generosity. 
There  are two means at the author's  disposal  for addressing  this con- 
cern. One is to do the opposite of what she has done already:  run the 
regressions for those without any pension income in her SIPP-EWH 
sample. There is no issue of omitted pension generosity in this specifi- 
cation. Eyeballing  the results in table 6, it appears  that this would sup- 
port  her causal  inferences, since the results  for the full sample  are about 
the same as those for the sample with pension income. Alternatively, 
she could control  for pension  generosity, which is available  in the SIPP- 
CJR  data set. Of course, pension benefits may differ  with age in a way 
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justment  over  the retirement period.  This could be addressed  by first 
correcting  pension  benefits  for age in an auxiliary  regression  and in- 
cluding the corrected value in the base regression.  While these data are 
not ideal, since it is pension "spikes" and not benefit levels that are found 
to be most important in determining retirement, this control could move 
us part of the way toward resolving this difficult issue. 
It is difficult to gauge the importance of these ommitted variables. But 
one further means of assessing  Madrian's results is to compare them to 
previous research.  She finds that having retiree health insurance raises 
the  probability  of  early  retirement  by  approximately  7.5  percentage 
points in the SIPP-EWH sample. On average, for this sample, the proba- 
bility that an individual retired early was 50.6 percent,  so that her find- 
ings imply an increase in the early retirement probability of 14.8 percent. 
In related papers, the author and I have examined the effect on retire- 
ment of the much more limited coverage made available by continuation 
mandates.6 This coverage  was assigned  exogenously  to individuals by 
state legislatures,  overcoming  these  potential omitted  variable biases. 
We found that one year of continuation coverage  raised the probability 
of early retirement by 5.4 percent, an effect that is roughly one-third as 
large. However,  the average early retiree in the SIPP-EWH  sample is 
retired for 3.1 years, so that on an annual basis Madrian's estimates are 
almost exactly  the same as those  uncovered  in our earlier work.  This 
suggests that there is little upward bias to the findings in this paper. 
The second  issue  raised by the paper is whether these  findings can 
explain the "excess"  retirement at age 65. A number of authors,  most 
recently Lumsdaine,  Stock, and Wise, have noted that, even controlling 
for the structure of pension  and social  security  incentives,  individuals 
are excessively  likely to leave their job at age 65.7 A natural explanation 
this phenomenon  is the presence  of Medicare,  which provides  highly 
subsidized insurance coverage to those over 65. In this paper, however, 
Madrian finds that this age 65 "spike" is present for those  with retiree 
insurance coverage also. This would seem to refute the role of Medicare 
as a causal mechanism. 
This test could be refined along two dimensions.  First, there has been 
no study that has considered  the interaction between  retiree insurance 
coverage  and pension incentives around  age 65. If those firms  that pro- 
6. Gruber  and  Madrian  (1993a,  1993b). 
7.  Lumsdaine,  Stock, and  Wise  (1993). 246  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
vide retiree  coverage  also provide  generous  pension "spikes"  at age 65, 
this could explain why the pattern  of excess retirement  persists even 
among this subsample. Second, one explanation  for the limited esti- 
mated  role of Medicare  is that the coverage is not very generous, with 
large  copayments  and high  out-of-pocket  maximums.  This can be tested 
by splitting  the effect of retiree  coverage  on retirement  into the effect on 
the pre-65  retirement  decision and the post-65 retirement  decision. If it 
is the limited  nature  of Medicare  that reduces its effects, then "topping 
off' Medicare  with retiree  coverage should still have effects on post-65 
retirement  decisions. This test obviously cannot be undertaken  with 
Madrian's  data, since it would involve selecting on the dependent  vari- 
able, age at retirement. But it can be undertaken  with data from the 
Health and Retirement  Survey, a forthcoming  longitudinal  survey of 
older workers, which will allow hazard  modeling  of the retirement  de- 
cision. 
Finally, we come to the most timely of the issues: what do these re- 
sults imply  for health  care reform?  For those without  retiree  coverage, 
the availability  of lower-cost group  insurance  on the job but expensive 
individual insurance after retirement is a potential source of ineffi- 
ciency. The fact that workers respond so strongly to retiree coverage 
suggests that there may be large  welfare  gains from  reducing  this ineffi- 
ciency by increasing  the availability  of group  coverage  for early  retirees. 
That  is, a policy of continuation  coverage  that  is not limited  to 18  months 
but  extended  until  age 65  would  increase  welfare  by "leveling  the playing 
field"  between work (where presumably  the cost of insurance is paid 
through  lower wages) and retirement  (where it would be paid out of 
pocket). Distortions  between work and nonwork  could be further  miti- 
gated  by making  health  insurance  premiums  paid  on the worker's  behalf 
taxable. This would have the additional  advantage  that it would help 
compensate for the reduced income and payroll tax collections that 
would occur if retirement  increased. 
Under  the Clinton  plan, group  coverage is made available  to retirees 
through  purchase  from  regional  alliances, which is mandatory  for all in- 
dividuals  and  all but the largest  firms.  However, an important  additional 
feature  of the Clinton  plan is that the government  pays the majority  of 
the cost of insurance  for those over 55 who label themselves (arbitrarily) 
"early  retirees,"  while those under  that  age have to pay their  own insur- 
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playing  field, the Clinton  plan has tilted it toward  retirement.  This plan 
involves a large intergenerational  redistribution,  as younger workers 
both pay higher  (community-rated)  premiums  to support  older workers 
in their  regional  pool and  pay higher  taxes to support  the subsidies  going 
to "early  retirees."  To the extent that  the plan  is in place  for many  years, 
there is no redistribution  from a lifetime perspective. However, given 
the likely constant  evolution  of health  policy in the coming  decades, this 
could be an important  short-run  horizontal  inequity. 
The efficiency cost of such a redistribution  is threefold. First is the 
distortion  to the labor  supply  of young  workers  from  financing  this sub- 
sidy. Second is the distortion  to the retirement  decision  from having  the 
subsidy. Third  is the distortion  to the choice of partial  versus full retire- 
ment. Completing  the missing  group  insurance  market  for older  workers 
would  allow them  to optimize  over their  hours  worked,  perhaps  partially 
retiring  from  a full-time  job with benefits  to a part-time  job without  bene- 
fits. But restricting  the subsidy  to only full retirees  distorts  this decision 
margin  as well, leading  to excessive full retirement.  Madrian  finds that 
the effect of retiree coverage in her data are fairly insensitive to the 
definition  of retirement  chosen. However, employer policies may be 
more flexible with respect to partial  and full retirement  than would be 
the Clinton  subsidy. Evidence on the treatment  of full and  partial  retire- 
ment by employer  retirement  plans would be helpful  in addressing  this 
point. 
To summarize,  I think that this is a very well executed paper  on an 
important  topic. The author  has both been careful  to consider detailed 
modeling  issues and  honest about  possible pitfalls  in her strategy.  I think 
that further  analysis of this question with the forthcoming  Health and 
Retirement  Survey will help to pin down some of the remaining  ques- 
tions. But the author  has convinced me that  the basic results  uncovered 
here  will bear  out under  further  scrutiny  with improved  data. 
General Discussion 
Much of the discussion concerned how data limitations  complicate 
the interpretation  of the results. Bruce  Petersen  suggested  that  the omis- 
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is likely to be correlated  with postretirement  health benefits, because 
higher-wage  jobs are more likely to offer these benefits. Since greater 
wealth  itself may  encourage  earlier  retirement,  the results  may  overstate 
the effect of health benefits. Madrian  suggested that pensions are the 
most important  omitted factor. She added, however, that data on the 
level of pensions  alone would  be of limited  value  in separating  the effects 
of postretirement  health benefits from the effects of pensions. Recent 
research  suggests  that  differences  in the timing  of eligibility  for pensions 
are more important  for retirement  decisions than the level of pensions, 
so that  data  on the timing  of eligibility  for pensions would be required. 
John Shoven noted that firms frequently offer "window"  plans in 
which benefits  are temporarily  sweetened for those who retire  within  a 
certain  time period, and he suggested  this could affect the results in the 
paper. Based on preliminary  results  from other research she has done, 
Madrian  reported  that  when "window"  plans  are  offered,  the health  care 
component  typically  is not sweetened. Retirement  associated with win- 
dow plans does not appear  to be related  to improvements  in postretire- 
ment health  benefits. Although  window plans may be offered more fre- 
quently  by firms  that  have good retiree  health  benefits,  Madrian  doubted 
that  the presence of window  plans  affected  the results in the paper. 
Robert Moffitt suggested that observations on individuals  who are 
still working  might be needed to avoid selection bias that may remain 
even in the truncated  regressions of the paper. With such additional 
data, retirement  probabilities  for people of the same age could be exam- 
ined directly  to see whether  they are increased  by the presence of retire- 
ment health  insurance  benefits. Data on working  individuals  could also 
address the possibility that there are systematic differences between 
workers  in firms  that  do and do not offer retiree  health  benefits. 
James  Tobin  noted that  many  retirees  remain  in the labor  force in one 
way or another.  Thus, knowing  how increasing  the availability  of retire- 
ment health benefits would affect the number  of retirees does not ade- 
quately  describe how it would affect the supply  of labor  hours. In addi- 
tion to knowing how many individuals  would be induced to retire by 
improvements  in retiree health benefits, it would be useful to examine 
the changes  in hours  worked  by such individuals. 
Madrian  commented  on Gary  Burtless's suggestion  that estimates of 
the effect of social security on retirement  decisions could be used to 
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the present  value of postretirement  health  benefits  received by an indi- 
vidual would affect retirement  in the same way as additions  to lifetime 
wealth received in the form of social security. Madrian  observed that 
this calculation  would  be complicated,  because the increment  to wealth 
from  retiree  health  benefits  depends  upon  how soon before  eligibility  for 
Medicare an individual retires and because their value depends im- 
portantly  on preexisting  medical conditions of individuals.  She noted, 
however, that such wealth effects could be substantial;  the present dis- 
counted value of postretirement  health insurance  may far exceed that 
of social security benefits  for a worker  retiring  at age 55 from General 
Motors. 
Turning  to the effects on labor demand,  William  Brainard  suggested 
that  requiring  firms  to help  pay for postretirement  insurance  might  lower 
the demand  for labor  and  reduce  other  forms  of compensation.  Estimat- 
ing the effects on employment  of improved  retiree  health  plans requires 
knowledge of this response. Burtless suggested that these responses 
might  completely offset the effect of improved  retirement  health bene- 
fits; if firms  were meeting their goals for recruitment  and retention  be- 
fore such benefits,  they would  look for other  changes  to offset the effects 
of the improved benefits on early retirement. Finally, Greg Mankiw 
asked whether  we should  regard  it as good or bad if retiree  health  bene- 
fits induce earlier retirement.  He noted that every developed country 
has a social security system designed to encourage early retirement, 
raising  the possibility  that early retirement  is actually  a policy goal. 250  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1994 
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